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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A Land of Opportunity? How Perceptions of Financial Prospects Affect Racial and 
Ethnic Groups’ Political Participation. (May 2006) 
Christina Marie Suthammanont, B.A., New York University 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Jan E. Leighley 
             Dr. David A.M. Peterson 
 
This dissertation develops and empirically tests a theory of political participation that 
posits that the local economic context moderates the effects of individuals’ 
socioeconomic status by influencing their prospective financial outlooks.  These 
perceptions, in turn, affect individuals’ likelihood of engaging in various political 
activities.  I examine the theory using indicators of economic vitality and status both for 
the entire population and for racial and ethnic group-specific economic conditions.  This 
two-pronged approach allows me to assess the extent to which group-specific conditions 
are more salient for minority group members than are more traditional contextual (full 
population) measures that reflect the economic status of the entire population.  Thus, 
such questions as whether blacks’ financial outlooks are influenced more by the 
visibility of black-owned businesses or by the total visibility of business activity are 
addressed.  Hypotheses are tested using the 1992 National Election Study, the 1995 
Texas Minority Survey, and economic data collected from the U.S. Census Bureau, 1992 
Economic Census. Results indicate that the financial perceptions of blacks and Latinos 
are significantly related to levels of political activity while the financial outlooks of 
Asians and whites are not significantly related to their political activity. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The importance of socioeconomic status1 as a predictor of political participation among 
whites has been firmly established by scholars. As Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980, 24) 
state, “education has a very powerful independent effect on the likelihood of voting” 
among whites. Among racial and ethnic minorities, however, the effects of 
socioeconomic status are less pronounced. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 360), 
for example, find that among different racial groups, “education is not a significant 
predictor of voting once [additional] variables are taken into account.” Hence, the theory 
that is predominantly relied upon to explain whites’ political behavior fails to adequately 
account for the political behavior of Asian-Americans, blacks, or Latinos.2  
 In the absence of consistent findings related to the effects of socioeconomic 
status on minority political participation, numerous theoretical arguments have been 
proposed to account for racial and ethnic groups’ political behavior.  In so doing, 
however, scholars have failed to contemplate the behavior of these groups within a 
shared or common theoretical framework.  In essence, “studies of minority participation 
                                                
This dissertation follows the style of The American Journal of Political Science. 
1 Socioeconomic status, or SES, has typically been measured with individuals’ educational attainment, 
income, or occupation or some combination of the three.  Of these three indicators, education has been the 
most consistent and strong predictor of an individual’s likelihood to participate in political activities. 
Although income, independent of education, exerts little influence on political activity (Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1980), it is nonetheless overwhelmingly included in measures of SES. 
2 Scholars have referred to racial and ethnic minority groups variously over the years.  In this paper, I refer 
to these groups in the following manner:  Asian-Americans as Asians. Because of the heterogeneity among 
the black population (e.g., people from the West Indies often refer to themselves as distinct from African-
Americans), I refer to this group as blacks. I use the term Latino to refer to Hispanics and Puerto Ricans, 
as well as those who derive from Latin (South) America. The majority, non-minority group is referred to 
as whites, as is typically done. When citing specific studies, however, I use the terms originally used by 
authors of such studies. 
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are motivated by different theoretical frameworks and typically focus on a single group, 
ignoring the question of the extent to which these alternative theories might generalize to 
other groups” (Leighley 2001, 15). 
 This dissertation contributes to what accounts for the political behavior of Asian, 
black, Latino, and white Americans’ levels of political participation.  Although 
socioeconomic status is expected to remain a significant predictor of whites’ political 
behavior, whites and minority groups’ levels of political participation may be further 
accounted for by considering the role of prospective financial outlooks.  In particular, I 
postulate that individuals’ political behavior is not only a product of their socioeconomic 
status, but also of their perceptions of their financial prospects.   In addition, such 
perceptions are shaped, at least in part, by the local economic conditions in which the 
individual lives.  As such, the political behavior of individuals is assessed with a special 
emphasis on the local economic context.  
 I begin with an overview of empirical research on the political behavior of whites 
and racial and ethnic minority groups. This is followed by a brief discussion of the social 
context and what scholars know about its effects upon political participation.  I then 
make the argument that individuals’ perceptions of their financial prospects is a critical 
link missing from these previous studies. After laying out the data and measures used in 
this study, I conclude with an outline of the chapters to follow. 
Mass, Racial, and Ethnic Political Participation 
Over the years, a number of empirical studies have validated the effects of 
socioeconomic status on whites’ political behavior.  Whites with higher levels of 
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socioeconomic status tend to participate in political activities more than whites with 
lower levels of socioeconomic status (Conway 1985; Teixeira 1987; Verba and Nie 
1972; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Higher 
levels of socioeconomic status among whites are significantly associated with political 
interest, which is a strong predictor of voting (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; 
Bennett and Resnick 1990) and political efficacy (Verba and Nie 1972). According to 
Verba and Nie (1972, 126), “individuals of higher social status develop such civic 
orientations as concern for politics, information, and feelings of efficacy, and these 
orientations lead to political participation.” 
Racial and ethnic minority groups typically have lower levels of education and 
income than whites. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, 83.6% of whites were high 
school graduates and 26.1% have a college degree whereas 72.3% of blacks are high 
school graduates and 14.3% of blacks have a college degree.  Latinos have the lowest 
educational attainment among whites, blacks, and Asians: 52.4% are high school 
graduates and 10.4% have a college degree.  Participation levels, thus, appear to reflect 
educational attainment of the various groups: blacks have participation levels 
comparable to whites while Latinos have the lowest levels of political activity. 
As mentioned above, although income has not, in general, exert as strong an 
influence on levels of political participation as education does, it is still overwhelmingly 
included in discussions of socioeconomic status.  Still, income levels undermine the 
otherwise straightforward explanation of political behavior; that levels of participation 
reflect educational attainment among groups.  Blacks have the lowest median income 
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among whites and Latinos (U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey 2001) yet 
blacks have participation rates comparable to whites. Latinos, as a group, have a higher 
median income than blacks, yet have lower levels of political participation (Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 232-235). Thus, although educational attainment and 
participation rates appear to parallel one another among whites, blacks, and Latinos, 
levels of income do not conform to the expected pattern.  That is, while scholars expect 
higher levels of socioeconomic status to lead to higher levels of political participation, 
income does not.  
What scholars know about the relationship between socioeconomic status and 
political participation for racial and ethnic groups is almost exclusively based upon black 
and Latino behavior (Leighley and Vedlitz 1999). Theoretically motivated studies of the 
relationship between Asians’ socioeconomic status and their political participation levels 
are rare.  Yet Asians have the highest levels of educational attainment (80.4% of this 
group are high school graduates and 44.1% have a college degree) and the highest 
median income of any of the groups ($55,500 for Asians followed by $45,900 for 
whites, $30,400 for blacks and $33,400 for Latinos) (U.S. Census Bureau, Current 
Population Survey 2001). While some scholars have found that Asians’ socioeconomic 
status, in general, increases their likelihood to be politically active (Leighley and Vedlitz 
1999), others have found that Asians remain the least likely to vote (Uhlaner, Cain, and 
Kiewiet 1989). In fact, some have found a negative relationship between socioeconomic 
status and political participation for Asians (Lien 1994).  
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 Theories of racial and ethnic minority groups’ political behavior tend to 
emphasize in-group characteristics or contexts, such as citizenship and acculturation in 
the U.S. (Lien 1994; Pachon and Desipio 1992), racial group identity or consciousness 
(Lien 1997, 2001; Reese and Brown 1995; Thornton and Mizuno 1999), religious 
affiliation (Jones-Correa and Leal 2001; Mattis 2001)3 or contextual elements such as 
religious institutions (Calhoun-Brown 1996; Harris 1994; Wong 2000).  Also examined 
are the racial or ethnic environment (Leighley 2001, esp. ch. 7; McClain and Karnig 
1990; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001; Santiago and Wilder 1991), community 
organizational environment (Garcia and de la Garza 1985), and the political context 
itself, which may include elite mobilization efforts and group empowerment (Bobo and 
Gilliam 1990; Cassel 2002; Gay 2001; Jackson, Gerber, and Cain 1994; Leighley 2001; 
Pachon and DeSipio 1992; Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Shaw, de la Garza, and 
Lee 2000). 
 Empirical studies of theories of racial and ethnic minority groups have produced 
relatively weak and often conflicting results, either within particular groups or across 
groups.  For instance, while the role of religious organization and affiliation has 
generally been found to be a significant factor in blacks’ political participation 
(Calhoun-Brown 1996; Harris 1994; Mattis 2001), its importance for Latino 
participation remains the subject of some scholarly debate (Jones-Correa and Leal 2001). 
 Moreover, theories of minority groups’ participation are generally particularistic 
with respect to the psychological or contextual traits associated with the group’s political 
                                                
3 But see Leighley and Vedlitz 1999 for a comparison of several key models used in evaluating minority 
group political behavior. 
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behavior. In other words, previous theories of minority groups’ political participation 
have tended to focus quite narrowly upon factors that are relevant to one group but may 
lack relevance or comparability with other groups.  As Leighley and Vedlitz observe, 
“most studies consider only one or two models at a time, usually testing the effects of 
socioeconomic status and psychological resources or group identity, and fail to include 
any other group-related or contextual factors” (1999, 1093).  
 My intellectual interest in the political behavior of racial and ethnic groups 
begins with the question of what common motivations might be found that account for 
the political activity of Asian, blacks, Latino, and white Americans. While theories of 
particular groups’ behavior are important for understanding particular groups, such 
theories generally do not help scholars account for similarities, or differences, between 
groups.  Still, before possible similarities or differences can be rigorously evaluated, we 
need to explore the political activity of individuals within racial and ethnic groups within 
a common theoretical framework.  For this goal to be achieved, one must identify an 
element common within minority group theories of participation. 
 The various theories posited to affect particular group’s political behavior does 
not mean that these theories do not share a similar underlying premise.  What each of the 
minority theories shares is the implicit assumption that individuals within each of these 
groups believes his or her quality of living (either directly or indirectly) will be better 
under certain circumstances.  For instance, according to group empowerment theory 
(Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Gay 2001; Leighley 2001), individuals of a particular minority 
group believe their personal, or group’s, interests will be more strongly advocated when 
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a member of one’s racial or ethnic background is in power.  Likewise, greater levels of 
citizenship among a particular minority group facilitates electoral power, thereby 
exerting greater influence on elected officials and increasing the group’s chances of 
obtaining desired goals or benefits.  In each case there is an, often implicit, assumption 
that the group’s political and social standing improves as a function of aggregate 
increases in the group’s electoral size (via citizenship), positions of power (via group 
empowerment), or mobilization (via group identity or consciousness or organizational 
structures). 
 In essence, explicitly addressing the issue of whether individuals believe their 
conditions will be better is needed.  While there are undoubtedly numerous dimensions 
on which one may evaluate ‘better conditions,’ I focus on individuals’ beliefs about their 
personal financial well-being because it is, arguably, the singular root that links 
Americans to the notion of the American Dream (Hochschild 1995).  For many, 
America, as a land of opportunity, freedom, and equality, means the opportunity, 
freedom, and protection to pursue one’s financial goals.  So while separate minority 
groups may be influenced by different group-related issues (e.g., citizenship), each 
individual within racial and ethnic groups, I would argue, is motivated by the desire to 
achieve some semblance of the American Dream (e.g., owning a home, providing their 
children with a good education, living in a safe neighborhood, etc.). 
Citizens with positive prospective financial outlooks may be more likely to 
engage in political activity because those with positive financial outlooks have likely 
benefited from the current social environment and, as such, have a vested interest in 
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issues affecting the community. Alternatively, based on studies of the influence of 
economic adversity on individuals’ participation, those with less positive financial 
outlooks may lack the energy to pay attention to policy issues (even if the issue affects 
their current status) due to their preoccupation with their current financial predicament 
(e.g., Rosenstone 1982). 
 Although the effects of individuals’ perceptions of their financial prospects on 
their likelihood of engaging in political activities have not been explicitly addressed 
within the extant literature, the effects of personal economic adversity on participation 
have received scholars’ attention (Rosenstone 1982; Scott and Acock 1979).  Three 
claims dominate this line of research.  The “mobilization theory” posits that financial 
adversity increases voter turnout since people under financial strain hold the government 
accountable for their situation (Schlozman and Verba 1979; see also Kernell 1977; 
Lipset 1960). 
 Alternatively, the “withdrawal” perspective argues that people with financial 
difficulties are less likely to vote since they are preoccupied with personal economic 
well-being.  As a result, people who suffer economic reversals may be so consumed with 
solving their financial problems that they may lack the time or the energy to engage in 
even the least demanding of political activities, such as voting (Brody and Sniderman 
1977).   Finally, if people with financial problems neither experience personal duress nor 
link their personal financial circumstances to political issues, then, according to the “no 
effect” perspective, economic adversity will not affect the likelihood of voting (Fiorina 
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1978).  Still, some scholars have claimed that the general finding within such studies is 
that financial adversity reduces the likelihood of voting (Rosenstone 1982). 
 These studies, however, have not considered the prospective financial 
perceptions of individuals as a determinant of their political behavior.  Because studies 
examining the effects of economic adversity on political participation have typically 
focused on the individual’s current work status (employed or unemployed), we do know 
whether it is, in fact, economic adversity or the psychological response to adversity (i.e., 
negative prospective financial outlooks) that affects political participation. In essence, 
while previous studies have examined the effects of current economic conditions on 
individuals’ political behavior, they have not considered the psychological component of 
such circumstances. 
Theoretical Framework 
The underlying theoretical framework of this study is drawn from social-psychological 
models of citizens’ political attitudes and behavior, described in greater detail in Chapter 
II.  These models posit that citizens do not form their political attitudes and resultant 
political behavior based solely on individual attributes such as socioeconomic status.  
Rather, citizens’ political attitudes and behavior are strongly influenced by the traits of 
the social context in which they live. 
Direct tests of whether citizens actually recognize the trait believed to influence 
their behavior (e.g., racial composition, the percentage of the population with a certain 
level of education, etc.) are rarely conducted.  Instead, contextual studies rely on casual 
10 
 
references to perceptions but do not measure individuals’ perceptions.4 All too often, 
such a practice does not reflect theoretical shortcomings of scholars.  Rather it likely 
reflects both the complexity of examining the social environment and the limitations of 
available data.  As noted by Erbring and Young, “the case becomes doubly confounded 
in conjunction with the empirical problems of separating the effects of individual 
attributes from the effects of social context in the determination of individual outcomes” 
(1979, 397).  Perhaps due to this difficulty, scholars have increasingly tried to 
understand how individuals’ attitudes or opinions are processed, transmitted, and 
received (Huckfeldt, et al. 1995; Huckfeldt, et al. 1998). While examining the ways in 
which political communication are transmitted or the clarity with which political signals 
are interpreted offer new insights into social communication processes, such studies fail 
to shed new light on the effects of the social environment itself. 
To better understand the influence of the social environment upon individuals’ 
political behavior I advance the notion that we need to develop a better understanding of 
the social-structural environment, itself.  Where traditional studies have relied upon 
conceptualizations of the social environment as some aggregated attribute of the 
individuals within the environment, I argue for the need to examine the structural 
economic element within the environment, thereby gaining some knowledge about how 
it contributes to individuals’ perceptions of their financial prospects.  Ultimately, I am 
                                                
4 For example: The proportion black of a population is X, the proportion of the same population that 
supports a particular candidate, who is anti-black, is Y.  The conclusion is that supporters of candidate Y 
perceive X as a threat.  Or, a majority of a population is Democrat. More members of the minority party 
support a Democratic candidate as the proportion of Democrats in their neighborhood increases.  
Therefore, minority party members must be influenced by the number of Democrats in their environment. 
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interested in whether these perceptions affect individuals’ likelihood of engaging in 
various political activities. 
 By evaluating the role of individuals’ perceptions of their financial prospects as 
the link between socioeconomic attributes and political participation, a more refined 
understanding of why socioeconomic status functions differently across racial and ethnic 
groups may be gained.  In addition, because the interest here is in individuals’ 
perceptions of their financial prospects, the frequently implicit assumption that citizens 
are motivated by the potential of something being better is explicitly addressed.  As 
illustrated in Figure 1.1, this relationship may be modeled as: 
 
FIGURE 1.1 Model of Political Participation: SES, Context, and Perceptions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Democratic theorists have traditionally regarded citizen participation as the 
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dissatisfaction with the system.  Others have postulated that there is also an intrinsic 
value of participation as a source of satisfaction, responsibility, and as an education 
device (Verba and Nie 1972).  In addition, research has shown that politically active 
citizens actually benefit from elected officials who reward those who participate (Hill 
and Leighley 1992), which suggests citizens with positive financial outlooks may engage 
in instrumental participation.  That is, citizens with favorable perceptions are motivated 
to participate when they stand to gain by such engagement while those with less 
favorable financial outlooks may be too consumed with their financial hardships to even 
pay attention to the issues of potential interest. 
Data and Measures 
 The central argument proposed is citizens’ perceptions of their financial 
prospects influence their likelihood of political activity.  Moreover, such perceptions are 
shaped, at least in part, by the visibility of local economic activity.  The visibility of 
local economic activity acts as a cue to individuals about their financial prospects. 
Previous studies of individuals’ political behavior have either focused on the correlation 
between socioeconomic status and political participation (for whites) or levels of 
participation despite individuals’ socioeconomic status (for racial and ethnic minorities). 
Yet, the effects of socioeconomic attributes such as education and income on political 
participation may be better understood by accounting for individuals’ perceptions of 
their financial prospects for two reasons.  First, individuals’ socioeconomic status is 
largely dependent upon the local resources available to sustain one’s status.  In other 
words, even high status citizens must live in areas that can provide employment 
13 
 
opportunities that match their skill or income levels. Second, by providing some account 
of the psychological responses to cues about economic opportunities, a theoretical link is 
formed between the individual and his or her environment.  As such, some traction may 
be gained on what accounts for political activity among even those with lower 
socioeconomic status. 
 Data are drawn mainly from three datasets.  Chapters II and III rely upon data 
drawn from the 1992 National Election Studies, Center for Political Studies, University 
of Michigan (NES).5 The NES is conducted around each national election, with pre-
election interviews and post-election re-interviews administered in presidential election 
years.  The 1992 study yielded 2,485 respondents in 144 counties who were U.S. citizens 
of voting age on or before the 1992 Election Day. A particularly appealing feature of the 
NES is that it contains numerous questions about individuals’ social and policy opinions 
as well as their political behavior and attitudes. 
Research evaluating the orientation of voters’ judgments (retrospective vs. 
prospective) provides ample evidence in support of the prospective nature of such 
judgments (Conover, Feldman, and Knight 1987; Kuklinski and West 1981). For 
instance, based upon Downs’ economic voting model, which asserts that voters seek to 
maximize their expected utility, Kuklinski and West point out that Downs’ theory 
“emphasizes that as purposive actors, voters are future-oriented in their political decision 
                                                
5 The ANES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 
Center for Political Studies, 1995-2000.  The NES is supported by the National Science Foundation, under 
grant numbers SBR-9707741, SBR-9317631, SES-9209410, SES-9009379, SES-8808361, SES-8341310, 
SES-8207580, and SOC77-08885, as well as the Russell Sage Foundation under grant number 82-00-01, 
and the University of Michigan. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in 
these materials are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the funding agencies. 
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making, i.e., they base their election decisions on what lies ahead” (1981, 437).  In 
addition, it doesn’t make sense to gauge individuals’ beliefs about the future with survey 
questions on their assessments of the past (Kuklinski and West 1981).   I use as the 
measure of individuals’ perceptions of their financial prospects, one dependent variable, 
the question asked on the 1992 NES survey:  
• Now looking ahead, do you think that a year from now you (and your family 
living here) will be better off financially, or worse off, or just about the same as 
now? 
 
Individual attributes that have been shown to significantly influence voters’ 
financial assessments are educational attainment, family income levels, current work 
status, and age. Higher levels of education and family income influence individuals’ 
financial perceptions since individuals with such characteristics are not as vulnerable to 
economic fluctuations as a result of having the personal resources necessary to adapt to 
changing economic conditions (e.g., change of occupational vocation or relocate to 
another area). 
Current work status is whether the individual is currently employed or not 
employed. Previous studies have shown that those who are unemployed have less 
favorable outlooks on their financial prospects (Weatherford 1983).  Age is also a factor 
in assessing individuals’ financial perceptions.  Previous studies have determined that 
age is influential on citizens’ political attitudes and behavior (Verba and Nie 1972; 
Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). When it comes to financial perceptions, older citizens 
who may be approaching retirement and the reality of living on a fixed income (e.g., 
social security benefits) may have less optimistic financial outlooks while younger 
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citizens may be more optimistic about their financial prospects since they are 
approaching -- or enjoying -- the years of optimal earnings. Other factors that may 
account for individuals’ financial outlooks are whether the respondent is male or female 
and party identification. 
The NES includes the 1990 population size of the town in which the interview 
was actually conducted, rather than the county population size. To match NES data with 
the Economic Census data (described below), the NES population size of towns was 
replaced with the U.S. Census Bureau’s 1990 county population in which the town 
exists. 
 In Chapter III, individuals’ likelihood of engaging in various political activities is 
the dependent variable. Political participation measures were drawn from the NES and 
include whether the respondent voted in the 1992 presidential election, persuaded others 
to vote for or against a particular party or candidate, displayed a political sign or wore a 
button, attended a meeting or rally, contributed money to a candidate or political party, 
volunteered work in the past 12 months, joined a community organization to solve a 
community problem (comwrk), or worked on behalf of a political candidate or party 
(polwrk).  Each of these activities is coded 1 if the respondent engaged in the particular 
activity or 0 if they did not. 
 Following others (Huckfeldt 1979; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), two 
indices were also generated to measure the extent of participation in both individually 
and socially based political activities.  The measure of individual political activity 
represents activities that require little or no social interaction.  It is comprised of whether 
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or not the respondent voted, contributed money, or displayed a political sign or wore a 
button.  Social political activity reflects activities that require greater social interaction 
and is comprised of whether or not the respondent attended a rally or meeting, 
volunteered work, or engaged in community organization. I omit persuading others’ 
votes from both measures primarily because the conditions under which the respondent 
would try to persuade another’s vote are ambiguous.  The respondent may have actively 
attempted to recruit passersby to vote for his or her preferred candidate or party or the 
respondent may have had a casual conversation with a co-worker about the campaign. 
Each of these political activities was summed and coded to reflect whether the 
respondent had engaged in at least one of the activities (=1) or none of the activities 
(=0).  While these indices suffer from some degree of conceptual and empirical overlap 
(Pearson’s R = .40), they represent sets of activities that require different levels of social 
interaction on the part of the participant. 
The NES data were sorted by the county Federal Identification Processing 
Standard (FIPS) code and merged with economic survey data. Because I consider the 
financial perceptions and political activity of individuals of racial and ethnic minority 
backgrounds in Chapter IV, the analyses in Chapters II and III are limited to 2,074 white 
respondents.  The dependent variables are either categorical or dichotomous, thus I use 
either ordered logit or logit to estimate the models. 
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Analyses in Chapter IV are based upon data drawn from a 1995 statewide public 
opinion survey of Texans that oversampled blacks, Latinos, and Asians.6 The survey was 
conducted using randomly selected telephone households in Texas between October 29, 
1993 and February 23, 1994.  The survey yielded 457 blacks, 716 Hispanics, 483 Asians, 
and 497 Anglos, a total of 2,153 U.S. citizens across 172 Texas counties for analyses. 
The Texas survey data were sorted by the county FIPS code and merged with economic 
census data.  The fact that the economic data were collected in 1992 yet the Texas 
survey was conducted in 1993 and 1994 raises the question of whether citizens’ 
responses accurately reflect responses to the economic conditions during 1992.  While it 
is preferable that the years of the surveys were identical, the difference is not 
problematic due to the realistic speed with which economic conditions change.  Any 
shift in local economic conditions between the economic environment in 1992 and 1993 
would have been either incremental (and therefore not a significant influence on 
perceptions) or the culmination of conditions already underway (thus capturing 
individuals’ anticipation of the trend). 
The Texas survey does not specifically ask respondents about their prospective 
financial perceptions.  Rather, respondents are asked whether they think their family will 
be better off in five years.  While this question does not specify one’s financial 
                                                
6 I thank Arnold Vedlitz of the Bush School of Government and Public Policy for providing these data.  
Research funding for the project was provided primarily by the Office of the Associate Provost for 
Research and Graduate Studies, Texas A&M University, through the Interdisciplinary Research Initiatives 
Program, along with the Center for Biotechnology Policy and Ethics, through the Institute of Biosciences 
and Technology; The Racial and Ethnic Studies Institute (RESI), the Public Policy Research Institute 
(PPRI); and the Department of Political Science, all academic units of Texas A&M University.  Principal 
investigators are James Dyer, Jan Leighley, George Rogers, and Gail Thomas. See Leighley and Vedlitz 
(1999) for a more detailed discussion of the Texas Minority Survey project. 
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expectation, I assume most would interpret “better off” in a financial sense.  Other 
individual level variables that have been shown to influence financial perceptions such 
as education, family income, age, party identification, and marital status are also 
included.7  
Although the Texas survey covers a broad range of diverse counties, the fact that 
most minorities live in urban locations must be accounted for.  Thus, for blacks, Latinos, 
and whites urban is measured with a dummy variable, coded either 1 if the respondent 
lives in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) or 0 if the respondent does not.  The MSA 
measure of urban, however, could not be used for Asian models due to completely 
determined observations.  In other words, all Asian respondents reside in MSAs in these 
data.  As a result, in models of Asians’ perceptions and behavior I use as the measure of 
urban the percent of the population ages 18-64 based on the logic that areas with a 
greater percentage of individuals within this age range are more likely to be urban than 
are areas with a proportionally greater or equal number of younger and older residents. 
In Chapter IV, the individual political activity measure includes voting, 
contributing money, or contacting an elected official.8 The social political activity 
measure is comprised of whether the respondent attended a political meeting or rally, 
joined a political organization, or volunteered work. As in Chapter III, each of these 
political activities was summed and coded to reflect whether the respondent had engaged 
in at least one of the activities (=1) or none of the activities (=0). 
                                                
7 Initial models also considered the work status and sex of respondents.  These variables were omitted 
from the models presented herein due to a consistent lack of statistical significance. 
8 In Chapter III, individually based political participation is measured with voting, contributing money, or 
displaying a sign/wearing a button.  Socially based political participation in Chapter III is identical to that 
used in Chapter IV.   
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Measures of the economic context were collected by the author from a variety of 
U.S. government sources, including the 1992 Economic Census, as issued by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce. Since these data have not been frequently used, I describe 
them in some detail. The economic census is conducted every five years covering years 
ending in 2 and 7 and surveys individual proprietorships, partnerships, and subchapter S 
corporations (collectively referred to as firms or businesses) throughout the United 
States.  Businesses are required by law9 to complete these surveys, or face a fine (which 
does not relieve them of their obligation to complete the survey). 
Since being fully integrated in 1954 (it was not on the 5-year interval until 1967), 
the economic census has been the leading source of facts about the structure and 
functioning of the nation’s economy.  The economic, agriculture, and governments’ 
censuses now collectively cover nearly 98 percent of all economic activity and, as such, 
these data provide essential information for government, business, industry, and the 
general public.  In fact, many of the measures used in economic voting studies are 
derived from the economic census: “The economic census furnishes an important part of 
the framework for such composite measures as the gross domestic product, input/output 
measures, production and price indexes, and other statistical series that measure short-
term changes in economic conditions” (U.S. Economic Census). 
Economic Context Measures 
Scholars of urban ghettos have identified three simultaneous changes in metropolitan 
labor markets that adversely affect the economic situation of residents (Jargowsky 1996; 
                                                
9 Title 13 of U.S. Code (sections 131, 191, and 224). 
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Wilson 1987): deindustrialization, a decrease in the share of metropolitan jobs in the 
manufacturing sector; employment deconcentration, a decrease in the share of all jobs; 
and occupational bifurcation, changes in production technology in all sectors that result 
in fewer middle income jobs.  Still, each of these factors has received mixed empirical 
support in studies assessing their influence on various aspects of blacks’ sociological 
environments. 
 Deindustrialization, for example, does not appear to increase ghetto poverty 
(Jargowsky 1996, 121) and the deconcentration of jobs matters only if the physical 
distance affects access to jobs and if [residents] cannot readily pursue jobs that move to 
suburbs (Jargowsky 1996, 123). Empirical evidence of the effects of occupational 
bifurcation appears to be largely dependent on how individual scholars categorize 
various industries into high-wage and low-wage sectors.  In addition, they also suffer 
from considerable empirical overlap: a decrease in the share of manufacturing jobs, 
particularly in metropolitan areas, should directly contribute to a decrease in the share of 
all jobs. 
Still, these changes may be used to gain some tractability for assessing the local 
economic context. Since my interests lay in determining the extent to which individuals 
obtain cues within their local contexts about their financial prospects, I consider the 
visibility of business activity rather than whether a decrease has occurred in any one 
economic sector (e.g., manufacture).  Doing so avoids the problem of selecting a 
particular sector (which may or may not appropriately reflect the dominant industry 
within a particular region).  This approach also has intuitive appeal in that a decrease in a 
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major economic sector, or several smaller sectors, in a particular region will affect the 
visibility of overall economic activity. 
In addition, some scholars have suggested that as the economy develops, 
“industrial specialization and the range of industries increase” from which the number of 
technological linkages within and between industries also grow.  As a result of these 
developments, one may infer that there tends to be a “growing ‘quality’ multiplier as the 
economy develops” (Thomas 1969, 51).  Since my interest here is in the visibility of 
economic activity rather than – in the strictest sense – industrial growth, I take the total 
number of firms as the measure of the level of industrial specialization and range and 
divide that number by the square miles of the county to gauge the visibility of business 
activity. 
 The number of people competing for local jobs influences individuals’ 
perceptions of their financial prospects through affecting their likelihood of not only 
obtaining jobs but also the wages they earn.  Population growth, while increasing 
consumer demand -- thereby increasing productivity and utilizing capital -- must also not 
exceed that which the market can absorb since excessive population sizes would lead to 
unemployment or reduced wages.  In short, if large workforce populations exceed the 
production capabilities of the economy, economic stagnation or decline occurs 
(Hamberg 1952).  Where employment deconcentration has focused on a general 
decrease of all jobs, irrespective of the workforce population, here, I measure workforce 
competition as the total population ages 18 to 64 divided by the total number of local 
businesses within each county. 
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While the Bureau of Labor and other government organizations typically define 
the workforce population as citizens ages 16 to 64, I omit 16 and 17 year olds for two 
reasons.  First, minors are (usually) dependent on parents or legal guardians for their 
financial well-being and, as such, do not choose where they live.  Second, NES 
respondents must be at least 18 years old.  As a result, data on individuals within these 
ages are not available for consideration (if one wanted to use the traditional workforce 
population measure).  
The economic context, thus, is measured with the total number of businesses with 
100 or more employees divided by county square miles (visibility of business activity) and 
the population ages 18 to 64 divided by the number of businesses with 100 or more 
employees (workforce competition). In addition to the visibility of business activity and 
workforce competition, I also consider the gross number of businesses with 100 or more 
employees in the community.  This measure, referred to as business activity, is distinguished 
from the visibility of business activity both conceptually and empirically.  The business 
activity measure assesses the total number of businesses in the community, regardless of the 
density – or visibility – of such businesses.  Hence, citizens may not be influenced by the 
visibility of such businesses but rather by the sheer number of businesses. Further, business 
activity is empirically different from the visibility measure; the Pearson’s R between the two 
measures is .18, indicating that the two measures do not significantly overlap.   
 In addition to these measures of the general economic context, data were collected 
for each group. The Survey of Minority-Owned Business Enterprises (MB92-1, MB92-
2, MB92-3, MB92-4, MB92-3RV) produces reports that are issued separately by the 
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U.S. Department of Commerce.  Each report provides information on the number of 
businesses owned by blacks, Hispanics, and Asians and Native-Americans, respectively.  
One deficiency of the Asian and Native-American report is the inability to separate these 
two groups.  As a result, the measure of Asian-owned businesses actually reflects Asian- 
and Native-American-owned businesses.  However, the number of Native-American-
owned businesses in Texas is relatively small.10 Thus, the measure of Asian-owned 
businesses is expected to be fairly representative of businesses that are actually owned 
by Asians.  The measure of a group’s visibility of business activity, then, is the total 
number of businesses owned by each group divided by county size (in square miles).  
Supplemental data were collected from the 1990 U.S. Census, the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 As Wacquant and Wilson have duly noted, “it is the net effect of several types of 
economic change and their possible interactions that ought to concern” scholars (1989, 
cited by Jargowsky 1996, 128).  Collectively, the measures of the local economic 
context employed herein offer an alternative to gross domestic product, unemployment 
rates, and inflation levels typically used to conceptualize economic conditions at both 
national and local levels (e.g., Weatherford 1983). 
Dissertation Outline 
In Chapter II, previous research on the political behavior of both whites and racial and 
ethnic minorities is reviewed along with studies of economic voting and the important 
role of economic perceptions. Establishing the connection between these two bodies of 
                                                
10 American Indian and Alaska Native persons constitute 0.6% of the Texas population (2000 U.S. Census 
Bureau.  Accessed 6 February 2006 at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48000.html.) 
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literature lays the foundation for the subsequent analyses within the dissertation.  The 
relationship between the local economic context and whites’ perceptions of their 
financial prospects is also tested. Because the nature of the relationship between local 
economic conditions, financial perceptions, and political behavior has not been 
systematically evaluated, I focus on whites in Chapters II and III in order to establish, in 
some senses, a baseline measure consisting of a representative national sample of whites 
of the relationship between the local economic context, financial outlooks, and political 
participation. 
 Chapter III considers the effects of whites’ prospective financial outlooks on the 
likelihood of engaging in political activity.  Analysis reveals that, among whites, better 
financial outlooks significantly decrease participation in some forms of political 
activities.  In addition, local economic factors are shown to have significant effects upon 
individuals’ political engagement, even when their perceptions do not.  Differences exist 
between social and individual forms of political activity, as well.  I discuss these results 
according to their implications for previous explanations for whites’ political activity. 
 The relationships between the local economic environment and racial and ethnic 
minorities’ prospective financial outlooks are established in Chapter IV.  In addition to 
considering the effects of the broader economic environment and such individuals’ 
financial perceptions, the effects of group-specific economic conditions are assessed.  In 
other words, the questions of how blacks’ financial outlooks are influenced by black-
owned businesses, how Latinos’ financial outlooks are influenced by Latino-owned 
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businesses, and how Asians’ financial outlooks are influenced by Asian-owned 
businesses are addressed. 
 The effects of prospective financial perceptions of individuals within the four 
racial and ethnic groups on their political behavior are also evaluated in Chapter IV.  As 
with whites, there is great variation among the groups when it comes to the effects of 
financial perceptions and the types of political activities in which they engage.  Some 
surprising similarities, and some surprising differences, among the groups emerge that 
challenge the ways racial and ethnic groups’ political behavior might be studied in the 
future. And this is the issue addressed in the final chapter.   Some preliminary 
conclusions are drawn from the analyses within the chapters with an eye toward their 
meaning for future research on the political behavior of racial and ethnic groups, both 
within the United States and within a comparative politics framework. 
Contributions 
This dissertation addresses three fundamental questions. To what extent does the local 
economic context influence citizens’ prospective financial outlooks? Do such 
perceptions affect individuals’ likelihood of engaging in political activity? Finally, how 
are racial and ethnic groups’ financial perceptions influenced by group-specific 
economic conditions as opposed to the general economic environment?   
 Democratic theorists have long maintained that a politically involved citizenry is 
necessary for democracy to thrive (Nagel 1987).  The question of how individuals 
respond to their local economic environments, however, has implications for a broader 
understanding of political activities that may be either unconventional at best or directed 
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at subverting a political regime at worst.  In the United States, the civil rights movement 
of the 1960s was comprised of thousands of blacks and their sympathizers who 
peacefully demonstrated in the streets, boycotted businesses, and broke down barriers to 
their participation in the electoral arena.  Those who were unsatisfied with the progress 
of the movement advocated a more radical, and violent, approach.  Still, the goal of both 
groups – those who were conventional and those who were less so – was to affect 
political changes that would enable economic and social advancement and opportunity. 
 For the past forty years, black, Latino, and, more recently, Asian Americans have 
made both political and economic strides; but not without occasional sparks of racial 
tension that have, at times, flared into riots.  Yet the story of minorities, especially 
blacks, in the U.S., is not unique.  In 2005 riots in France lasted ten long nights and 
resulted in hundreds of arrests, more than 1,000 vehicles burned, and many buildings 
destroyed.  These riots arose from public housing developments largely occupied by 
French Arabs who have among the highest unemployment rates and who regularly 
encounter discrimination. 
 The unique integration model of France, which subordinates race, ethnicity, or 
religion to the common goal of being French, has allowed minorities to be left behind – 
and not just economically.  “…discrimination has flourished behind the oft-stated ideals, 
leaving immigrants and their French-born offspring increasingly isolated in government-
subsidized apartment blocks to face high unemployment and dwindling hope for the 
future” (Smith 2005; italics mine).  This isolation comes in many forms, be it political, 
economic, or social, and culminates in less optimism for one’s future.   
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 While economic conditions have generally been assessed in terms of third-world 
GDP and inflation, the general conclusions may be equally applied to mass reactions to 
economic frustrations at the individual level in Western democracies.  To wit, economic 
conditions influence “the timing and terms of democratic transitions and posttransition 
political alignments” (Haggard and Kaufman 1997, 266) and such “crisis conditions 
provide oppositions with new opportunities to draw adherents by linking economic 
circumstances to the exclusionary nature of the political order” (ibid., 268). 
Extrapolating from this line of research and the example that the recent riots in France 
provide, it seems likely that financial frustrations, especially when combined with 
racially motivated barriers to economic and social advancement, render a potentially 
significant threat to an existing political order. 
 The following empirical evidence underscores the importance of integrating 
contextual influences and addressing psychological factors affecting individuals’ 
decisions to participate.  While the general model introduced earlier receives mixed 
support, depending on the particular ethnic or racial group considered, the analyses 
contribute to the broader intellectual community by addressing several gaps in our 
empirical evidence regarding the nature of the relationship between the social context, 
individuals’ psychological responses to the context in which they reside, and political 
participation. The chapters that follow support that which is already widely 
acknowledged in both academic and social settings: citizens’ responses to their local 
environments are highly complex and such variations primarily reflect ethnic and racial 
differences. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE LOCAL ECONOMIC CONTEXT AND PERCEPTIONS 
OF FINANCIAL PROSPECTS  
Flint is the fourth largest city in Michigan.  Located in Genesee County along the Flint 
River, the city lies about 60 miles northwest of Detroit.  Many scholars consider the 
vicinity of Flint to be the oldest continually inhabited part of Michigan, though its 
population has recently fallen roughly 3.7% (from 124,943 in 2000 to 120,292 in 2003) 
(U.S. Census Bureau).11 Genesee County is overwhelmingly white, although its black 
population is sizeable (78% and 19.5% respectively).12 Flint is perhaps best known for 
its auto industry – both its ascension and its decline.  During World War II, the city was 
a major contributor of tanks and other war material due to its extensive manufacturing 
facilities.  As a major population center and an economic powerhouse, Flint enjoyed 
both political importance and economic security.  
 However, since the 1960s, Flint has suffered from disinvestment, 
deindustrialization, and depopulation. Most recently the economic bedrock of Flint, the 
auto industry, including the largest automaker in the world, has proposed drastically 
reducing both wages and benefits of its employees (Hakim 2005). Blacks have been 
disproportionately affected by the demise of Detroit’s labor unions (Uchitelle 2005), 
perhaps leading to increased racial tension. The city has one of the highest crime rates in 
                                                
11 U.S. Census Bureau.  (Accessed 22 January 2006 at http://quickfacts.census.gov.) 
12 According to the 1990 U.S. Census, Genesee County is 78% white, 19.5 black, 2% Hispanic 
of any race, and less than 1% American Indian and Asian groups combined. (U.S. Census 
Bureau 1990 Summary Tape File. Accessed 21 November 2005 at http://factfinder.census.gov.) 
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Michigan and, in 2004, the 2nd highest violent crime rate in the United States.13 In 2002 
the city was placed into receivership because it could not pay its debts, although it has 
since regained local control. 
 Factors blamed for the economic and social malaise afflicting Flint include 
Reaganomics, outsourcing and exporting jobs abroad and to non-union facilities, 
unionization and exorbitant overhead, globalization as well as the decline of the 
American auto industry. Such rationales are, according to some, applied along partisan 
lines with labor issues the most divisive and polarizing local issue. 
The economic rise and fall of Flint, Michigan, is not unique.  Indeed, 
communities experience economic peaks and valleys regularly. Some regain economic 
strength quickly while others languish for decades. Yet, despite the centrality of local 
economies to people’s lives, its implications for mass political behavior remains largely 
unknown. As communities’ economic conditions thrive and decline, how do local 
residents react politically?  
Opportunities and resources are unevenly distributed in space.  In response, 
people attempt to convert improved socioeconomic standing into “improved residential 
circumstances, which not only yield immediate tangible benefits but also enhance the 
prospects for success by providing greater access to important resources such as higher 
education” (Massey 2000, 44).  Such “attempts” are based, in part, upon how the 
individual views his or her financial prospects. According to some, the ideology of the 
                                                
13 According to the 2003 FBI Report of Offenses Known to Law Enforcement, Flint’s murder rate is 3.00 
times the national average, forcible rape is 2.79 times the national average, and all violent crimes are 2.03 
times the national average. (Accessed 21 January 2006 at http://www.cityrating.com/citycrime.) 
30 
 
American Dream – the faith that an individual can attain success and virtue through 
strenuous effort – is the very soul of the American nation (Hochschild 1995).  People 
living in thriving14 communities -- with their bustling Main Street stores, filled 
restaurants and cafes, corner banks, and indoor malls – should have more favorable 
financial prospects due to greater economic opportunities available within such 
communities.  In contrast, individuals within economically declining communities, 
characterized less by busy streets than by littered ones, more by fast food chains than by 
dine-in restaurants, and more by loitering unemployed males rather than by strolling 
shoppers – should have, relative to people in thriving communities, less favorable 
perceptions of their financial prospects.  
 Local economic conditions affect citizens’ perceptions of their financial 
prospects for at least two reasons.  First, individuals’ financial livelihoods are dependent 
upon not only the availability of employment within their immediate geographic space 
but also on how well individual skills match the available jobs (Moss and Tilly 2001). 
Most jobs require skilled tasks, educational or skill credentials, or both and businesses 
are demanding higher levels of qualifications and abilities. Moreover, increased 
demands by businesses for higher levels of qualifications and abilities have a significant 
influence on those with limited education. Research has shown that “black and Latino 
men, in particular, are disproportionately selected out of the jobs that have skill 
                                                
14 Adjectives such as ‘thriving,’ ‘flourishing,’ or ‘declining’ do not imply changes in the empirical sense 
of a change between, say, t and t-1.  Rather, such adjectives refer to a general, static impression one might 
gain of the environment.  Analogously, although a human being is constantly changing, we nonetheless 
observe the general health of individuals as healthy, sick, etc. even though they may be physically 
recovering from an illness or getting sick.  Still, I try to use the most accurate language when doing so is 
not cumbersome or confusing. 
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requirements” (Moss and Tilly 2001, 463).  Hence, one might expect members of racial 
and ethnic minority groups to be more sensitive to local economic conditions.   
 Further, research showing that local economic factors directly affect individuals’ 
economic well-being is strong.  For instance, Thomas found that increases in 
productivity among local businesses resulted in an autonomous rise in real income 
(1969, 44).  In addition, studies assessing whether economic growth leads to income 
inequality have, thus far, yielded no empirical link between the rate of short-run 
economic growth or of faster rates of economic growth with income inequality (Chang 
and Ram 2000). Therefore, it is likely that local economic conditions influence 
individuals’ perceptions of their financial prospects since it affects their personal 
income. 
Second, individuals’ financial perceptions, regardless of whether they are 
optimistic or pessimistic, may act as stimuli for them to pay greater attention to political 
issues.  As observed with the example of Flint, Michigan, economic malaise may lead to 
attributions of blame, which may act to strengthen one’s partisanship. In addition, some 
groups’ beliefs on social issues such as poverty vary according to whether individuals 
attribute responsibility to either individuals or structural factors (Hunt 1996, 304), 
suggesting that groups who see structuralist reasons for poverty as important are more 
likely to turn to the political arena for a solution to such a problem.  Hence, while there 
is reason to believe strong negative and positive financial outlooks may increase one’s 
likelihood to participate, as an exploratory analysis of the role of financial perceptions in 
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political activity, this dissertation focuses on the influence of positive financial outlooks 
due to previous research showing that economic adversity decreases turnout. 
Theoretical Motivation 
People respond in different ways to a variety of community factors.  In addition to 
individual responses to the opportunities and resources available in their neighborhood 
communities (Massey 2000), citizens display different political attitudes and behaviors 
in response to the racial composition (Wright 1976) and socioeconomic characteristics 
(Giles and Dantico 1982; Huckfeldt 1979; Kenny 1992) of local communities. Local 
economic conditions also influence individuals’ perceptions of economic policy 
(Weatherford 1983).  Thus, it seems likely that individuals form judgments of their 
financial prospects in response to local economic conditions. 
 Research on individuals’ political attitudes and behavior has been conducted 
under numerous contextual frameworks. Within the broad range of such studies on 
participation four major dimensions may be identified: (1) the institutional and legal 
dimension (Hill and Leighley 1993, 1996; Lijphart 1997; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 
1980); (2) the political environment itself (Beck and Jennings 1979; Cox and Munger 
1989; Hill and Leighley 1993; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Leighley 2001; Rosenstone 
and Hansen 1996); (3) the individual psychological dimension (Beck and Jennings 1979; 
Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Zipp 1985); and (4) the social environmental 
dimension (Foladare 1968; Giles and Dantico 1982; Huckfeldt 1979, 1980, 1984; 
Huckfeldt, Pluzer, and Sprague 1993; Kenny 1992; Weatherford 1982, 1983; Wright, Jr. 
1976). 
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These studies have consistently shown that each of these contextual frameworks 
affects individuals’ political attitudes and participation. They differ, however, in two 
important respects.  The first difference is in the underlying perspective of the individual 
as either mobilized (or demobilized) by political elites and conditions or as passive 
recipient of social or political cues. The second important difference lies in the types of 
interaction between the contextual factor and the individual.  As Weatherford notes, 
“distinctions have been drawn between types of contextual effects in terms of their 
dependence on interpersonal processes” (1982, 122).  Hence, while the differences 
between these contextual studies are not mutually exclusive, distinguishing such studies 
along these lines facilitates identifying where the local economic context and citizens’ 
perceptions fit into the broader contextual literature. 
Studies within the institutional and legal dimension consider the extent to which 
institutional structures or electoral laws affect citizens’ political behavior. State 
registration rules -- as one general context -- provide an example of a legalistic condition 
affecting individuals’ likelihood of voting.  Numerous studies have empirically 
demonstrated that restrictive registration requirements negatively influence voter turnout 
(Hill and Leighley 1993, 1996; Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1978; Timpone 1998; 
Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). 
The political contest itself also provides a general context within which citizens 
may be mobilized to engage in various political activities, usually voting. Such studies 
have found individuals’ participation is affected by the closeness of elections (Cox and 
Munger 1989), party competitiveness (Hill and Leighley 1993), the candidates’ 
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ideological placement (Beck and Jennings 1979), and elite and social mobilization 
efforts (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992, 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen 1996). 
The political contest and institutional/legal dimensions of contextual studies have 
clearly shown that such environments have important implications for citizen 
participation. Still, the underlying premise of such studies is that the individual is 
actively recruited – or mobilized – to participate. For instance, Huckfeldt and Sprague 
assert that electoral politics is characterized by their “socially coercive, interactive, and 
dynamic” aspects (1995, 5). While citizens may respond differently to political, 
institutional, and legal conditions, such conditions are intended to alter the behavior of 
citizens, whether by deliberately encouraging or inadvertently discouraging their 
political participation. 
These two dimensions do not rely upon theories of social or personal interaction 
for the effects of the particular contextual factor to be present. Rather, they largely rely 
upon individuals responding to the abstract, impersonal nature of such contexts.  For 
example, Huckfeldt and Sprague claim that citizens’ responses to electoral politics are 
based upon the intangible effects of localized political information (1995, 5 italics mine; 
see also Huckfeldt et al. 1995). Likewise, studies finding that party competition 
influences turnout have argued that individuals are more likely to vote in competitive 
campaign environments since such contexts alter the individuals’ calculations of their 
probability of affecting the outcome (Hill and Leighley 1993, 1161).  
While the institutional/legal and political contest dimensions are largely 
characterized by their mobilizing and abstract qualities, studies within the individual 
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psychological and social environmental dimensions view individuals as passive 
recipients of, and responders to, the social and political cues within the social context.  
These studies examine citizens’ political responses to the broader social climate.  For 
example, Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) found that cross-pressured 
individuals (e.g., citizens with partisan loyalties different from those of their family or 
associates) displayed less interest in the 1948 presidential campaign and made their vote 
choices later than did individuals who did not experience such cross-pressures (see also 
Campbell et al. 1960; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1968). Over the years, studies 
within this dimension have increasingly been incorporated into research on the effects of 
the social environment as scholars have reached a general consensus that political 
decision-making and attitudes are interdependent and social in nature. 
 The importance of the local social environment as an influence on citizens’ 
political behavior and attitudes has been firmly established (Foladare 1968; Giles and 
Dantico 1982; Huckfeldt 1979, 1980, 1984; Huckfeldt, Pluzer, and Sprague 1993; Kenny 
1992; Weatherford 1982, 1983; Wright, Jr. 1976).  Huckfeldt (1979), measuring the 
local social context using the percentage of Buffalo, NY residents with 12 or more years 
of schooling, found that higher status neighborhoods encouraged political participation 
among higher status citizens but discouraged political activity among lower status 
citizens.  Moreover, lower status citizens in lower status neighborhoods were more likely 
to be politically active than their counterparts in higher status contexts.  Others have 
largely substantiated these findings, albeit using different data (Giles and Dantico 1982; 
Kenny 1992). 
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 Foladare (1968) evaluates whether the occupational character of the 
neighborhood influences residents’ partisanship and candidate preferences.  Also using 
data collected in Buffalo, NY, Foladare found that “members of manual families are 
progressively more likely to be Democrats as the proportion of manual workers living in 
the neighborhood increases” (ibid., 519).  The effects of such “occupational clustering” 
are more pronounced upon individuals’ candidate preferences: as the proportion of the 
population becomes more “manual,” preferences for presidential candidate Kennedy also 
increase (in heavily manual neighborhoods the ratio climbs to eleven to one).  Based 
upon these findings, Foladare concludes that the greater the exposure of individuals to 
members of their own group, the greater the likelihood that such groups will act as a 
positive reference group for individuals’ political behavior due to the reinforcing effect 
of the same influence. 
 In a study reaching similar conclusions, Wright, Jr. found that whites in southern 
counties with greater black populations were more likely to support presidential 
candidate Wallace (a pro-segregationist candidate) than were whites in counties with 
relatively smaller black populations.  Moreover, the effects differ between urban and 
rural areas.  Whites in rural areas where a greater proportion of the population is black 
were significantly more likely to support candidate Wallace than whites in urban areas.  
Further, increases in the black population led to a greater preference for Wallace, 
regardless of issue (1976, 211).  The author attributes these differences to the levels of 
support for Wallace by individuals’ primary group members. “Black concentration and 
urbanism influence voting for Wallace through affecting people’s primary groups and 
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their relative proximity to Wallace on the issue” (1976, 210) (see also Huckfeldt 1984 
for similar findings). 
 Within the psychological and social environmental dimensions, research has 
tended to focus on political attitudes and behavior (e.g., Foladare 1968; Giles and 
Dantico 1982; Huckfeldt 1979, 1980, 1984), social networking (Weatherford 1982) and, 
increasingly, communication (Huckfeldt et al. 1995; Huckfeldt et al. 1998) processes. 
These studies have clearly shown that individuals’ attitudes and behavior are 
significantly influenced by social environmental factors. Moreover, the effects of the 
social context endure even when individual attributes, such as education, are controlled 
for in the models; attributes that have consistently been strong predictors of political 
participation (Leighley and Nagler 1992; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; see also Leighley 1995 for field essay on 
political participation). And scholars of the social context have explicitly noted the 
interdependency of individual characteristics and contextual properties (e.g., Huckfeldt 
1979, 1980). 
When compared to the other contextual dimensions already considered, these 
studies tend to view individuals as passive recipients of cues as supplied by the social 
environment.  Essentially, where institutional/legal and political contest studies contend 
that such contexts actively alter individuals’ behavior, studies within the psychological 
and social environmental dimensions generally function from the perspective that such 
contexts have no such intention; their “influence” being a by-product of population 
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characteristics. As stated by Huckfeldt, people “respond to political events, cues, and 
opportunities which are specific to a given environment” (1979, 579; italics mine). 
Research along these dimensions also differs from the institutional/legal and 
political contest dimensions in the types of interaction postulated.  Here, the theoretical 
frameworks rely upon some form of social interaction among individuals as the vehicle 
for transmitting cues about social and political norms.  Moreover, interaction may be 
personal or impersonal. Such “social interactions take different forms: standing in line at 
the post office, getting together with friends, talking across a backyard fence or on a 
street corner, sharing the same public facilities --- supermarkets, gas stations, 
laundromats. None of the interactions are politically neutral” (Huckfeldt 1980, 231). 
While studies of the social context have yielded a rich body of knowledge on the 
effects of the local environment on participation, they have failed to account for the 
important role that the local economy plays in any community, which falls between the 
legal/institutional dimension and the psychological and social environmental dimension.  
The local economic context, like the institutional/legal context, affects individuals 
through its abstract, impersonal nature.  At the same time, it does not actively or 
intentionally alter citizens’ behavior.  Rather, effects of the local economic context are 
believed to be the result of passively received cues by individuals. 
Considering the role of the local economic context is important for several 
reasons beyond simply looking at one “new” contextual characteristic. Critics of (social) 
context studies have asserted that such studies provide no empirically tested link 
between the observed behavior and the community beyond correlations (Erbring and 
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Young 1979).  Since previous contextual studies have overwhelmingly relied upon 
aggregated individual attributes (e.g., educational attainment or party identification), the 
transmission of such effects is assumed to stem from social interaction.   Considering the 
local economy avoids the need to make assumptions about personal interaction since the 
economy doesn’t choose whom and how it affects individuals: it affects, to one degree or 
another, all members of the community.   
A second concern with previous contextual studies is the argument that people 
within geographic spaces “have a more difficult time avoiding each other” (Huckfeldt 
1980, 231). Scholars have challenged this notion of “boundedness,” the assumption that 
most of the politically important social relations of an individual occur within the local 
district, as being of limited applicability in an increasingly mobile society (Weatherford 
1982). The local economic context is not subject to the concern of “boundedness” since 
residents, who may work or socialize elsewhere, nonetheless return to their local 
community to live, shop, and otherwise engage in daily activities. 
A third reason evaluating the local economic context is important stems from the 
fact that economic issues largely fall under the purview of that which is considered in the 
political domain.  Political issues are, in most instances, distributional issues; the amount 
of money to be spent on one project necessarily takes money from another project. 
Moreover, the advantages and disadvantages of local projects are often a function of 
how the particular project may affect one’s well-being.  For example, economic policies, 
such as offering tax abatements to entice businesses (good for businessmen) at the 
expense of public housing (bad for low income people), are debated by elected officials.   
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So while contextual studies have contributed to our knowledge about citizens’ political 
attitudes and behavior, they have failed to adequately account for the theoretical reason 
why aggregated socioeconomic attributes of the community affect individuals’ political 
behavior.  
The Local Economic Context and Financial Perceptions 
There is good reason to expect the local economic context to affect citizens’ political 
attitudes and behavior since the economic conditions most clearly perceived by the 
individual are those close to home (Weatherford 1983, 869). Weatherford, for instance, 
examined the effects of local economic conditions and individuals’ experiences with 
unemployment on the formation of economic issue attitudes. Using the local Labor 
Market Area (LMA) as his geographic unit and its percent unemployed, he found that 
contextual economic conditions appear to motivate citizens’ opinions about the 
macroeconomy, even when demographic and attitudinal factors were controlled for in 
the model (Weatherford 1983, 879). According to this study, economic perceptions 
function as summary indicators of local economic grievances  (i.e., unemployment and 
inflation)(1983, 881).  Further, individuals “combine information about personal and 
local conditions to form subjective impressions of family financial situation and of the 
trend of national business conditions” (1983, 884, italics mine).  
Assessing individuals’ economic perceptions is not novel.  Indeed, evaluating the 
effects of voters’ economic perceptions has been a key component of studies on 
presidential approval (Brooks and Brady 1999; Chappell, Jr. 1990; Clarke and Stewart 
1994; Funk and Garcia-Monet 1997; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992; Norpoth 
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1996), presidential economic performance (Conover and Feldman 1986; Lau and Sears 
1981) and vote choice (Alford and Legge, Jr. 1984; Gomez and Wilson 2001; Sigelman 
1991; Wlezien, Franklin and Twiggs 1997).15  
Two intellectual debates define the economic voting literature.  The first debate 
revolves around the question of whether individuals make their political judgments 
based on retrospective economic conditions or on prospective economic evaluations 
(Alvarez, Nagler, and Bowler 2000; Clarke and Stewart 1994; Haller and Norpoth 1994; 
Lanoue 1994; Lewis-Beck 1986, 1988; Lockerbie 1991; MacKuen, Erikson, and 
Stimson 1992; Norpoth 1996; Uslaner 1989).  The second debate centers on whether 
such judgments are shaped by the individual’s economic circumstances (the 
“pocketbook” or egocentric perspective) or by assessments of the national economy (the 
sociotropic perspective) (Brooks and Brady 1999; Funk and Garcia-Monet 1997; Gomez 
and Wilson 2001; Sigelman 1991; Welch and Hibbing 1992).16 
While I do not attempt to resolve the dilemmas within these scholarly 
discussions, I do observe that, despite the plethora of research on the sources of or 
influences on voters’ economic perceptions, few systematic evaluations have been done 
on how such perceptions are influenced by local economic conditions. One exception is 
Weatherford, who found that the local economic context not only provides citizens with 
evidence about the condition of the national economy but also, and more importantly, 
                                                
15 For comparative studies along these lines, see Alford and Legge, Jr. 1984 (German national elections); 
Alvarez, Nagler and Bowler 2000 and Whiteley 1984 (British general elections); Lewis-Beck 1986 (cross-
national study); and Uslaner 1989 (Canadian federal elections). 
16 See Feldman 1984 for a review of literature on economic self-interest and evaluating the extent to which 
people are most likely to act on the basis of financial well-being and when they are most likely to do so. 
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that “living in a declining area predisposes one toward a slightly more pessimistic 
outlook on personal economic fortunes” (Weatherford 1983, 879). 
These studies presuppose two conditions: first, that unemployment and inflation 
rates have adversely affected individuals’ day-to-day living, and second that individuals 
are aware of changes in such economic indicators.17 While unemployment and inflation 
rates are certainly factored into individuals’ assessments of national economic policies, 
they are probably less likely to tangibly affect individuals’ daily experiences until they 
have reached a level at which point their impact is felt by local businesses. As Conover, 
Feldman, and Knight point out, “people may be especially insensitive to relatively minor 
or gradual shifts in the economy; they may only respond to changes that are large 
enough or dramatic enough to exceed some threshold of perceptions” (1986, 567; see 
also Alt and Chrystal 1983). 
Several scholars have noted the questionable effects of unemployment and 
inflation on citizens’ perceptions (Conover et al. 1986; Kraus 1997; Rosenstone 1982) 
and the relevance of such measures in today’s Western democracies (Tóka, nd).  For 
instance, Krause, distinguishing between multiple groups with varying levels of 
                                                
17 National unemployment rates typically hover around five percentage points. An increase of less than 
about two percentage points is not likely to alter individuals’ economic perceptions.  An increase from an 
average of five percent unemployed to about seven percent unemployed, on the other hand, is more likely 
to cause concerns about the overall health of the economy. For example, it is debatable the extent to which 
individuals are aware of, much less feel any ramifications of, the .5% decrease in unemployment over the 
past year; January of 2005 rate being 5.2%, January of 2004 was 5.7% among people 16 years and older. 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Likewise, inflation has fluctuated between 
2.3% (2004 first quarter) and 2.5% (2005 first quarter). Source: http://www.money-rates.com/indicators. 
Regional changes in these economic indicators vary even less significantly.  In Texas, for example, 
unemployment has alternated between 6.0% and 5.9% since August of 2004. California’s unemployment 
rate has fluctuated a total of .3% since August of 2004.  Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, accessed March 2005 at www.bls.gov/eag/home. Given the size of these states, and their 
economies, it is unlikely that any one community was particularly hard-hit by state unemployment rates. 
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“information” (i.e., education level), finds no instance in which changes in 
unemployment rates over a twenty-two year period significantly affected personal 
financial expectations and that inflation was an insignificant factor explaining variation 
in most of the groups’ expectations about the future (Krause 1997, 1186). As such, this 
scholar concluded that the effects of unemployment, inflation, and other conventional 
measures have differing impacts upon a heterogeneous electorate and, moreover, the 
influence of such measures is often felt by one segment of the population; i.e., either the 
least or the most informed. As noted by other scholars, “unemployment levels may [also] 
be irrelevant for some major social groups: those whose capital is mostly in land, 
savings, or social entitlements and those whose major stock is human capital, 
respectively” (Tóka, nd). So while unemployment and inflation rates have been shown to 
be factors in individuals’ assessments of national economic policies and conditions, they 
are probably unlikely to tangibly affect individuals’ daily experiences until they have 
reached a level at which point their impact is felt at the level of the local economy.  
In sum, on the one hand, studies of political participation within the social 
context have relied upon theories of social interaction.  Yet theoretical linkages between 
the citizen and his or her social environment rely upon the assumption that citizens are, 
in fact, interacting with others in the community.  In addition, such studies have 
overwhelmingly relied upon aggregated individual attributes to measure the social 
context.  
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Hypotheses 
The visibility of local business activity provides cues to individuals about the economic 
opportunities available to them. For instance, residents of communities in which 
economic opportunities are not readily perceptible are less likely to have favorable 
perceptions of their financial prospects.  Hence, greater visibility of business activity is 
expected to increase the likelihood with which citizens will have positive prospective 
financial perceptions (H1).  
Competition in the workforce is also likely to influence citizens’ financial 
perceptions. The more competition there is, not only for local jobs but also for jobs with 
better pay, the less likely people are to believe they have a chance at either increasing or 
sustaining their overall standard of living.  In addition, those of lower socioeconomic 
status are particularly vulnerable to greater levels of workforce competition since the 
jobs they are likely to seek generally have fewer educational requirements. Thus, 
relatively greater levels of workforce competition will reduce the likelihood with which 
citizens will have positive perceptions of their financial prospects (H2). 
Finally, local economic conditions have distinct impacts on communities that are 
readily perceptible to residents since the local economic context is the one most clearly 
perceived by individuals (Weatherford 1983). Thriving economic communities have a 
more stable tax base, better schools, nicer recreational facilities (e.g., parks), and more 
social services (e.g., street cleaning, garbage collection). These attributes of better 
economic communities stand in stark contrast to stagnant, or declining, communities 
characterized by fewer homeowners, under-funded schools, run down recreational 
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outlets (if any), and empty storefronts or businesses.  In short, various aspects of the 
local economic context, collectively, influence individuals’ perceptions of their financial 
prospects. Thus, each of these factors is considered simultaneously in the multivariate 
models in order to assess their relative influence on individuals’ financial perceptions.   
Results and Analysis 
Before assessing the effects of the economic context, it is useful to establish the extent to 
which citizens’ perceptions of their personal financial prospects are shaped by their 
individual attributes. As shown in Table 2.1, educational attainment has a significant 
influence on citizens’ perceptions of their financial prospects (p < .05). Scholars of 
economic perceptions have attributed the effects of education on voters’ financial 
assessments to their increased levels of sophistication (Lockerbie 1991) and information 
(Krause 1997).  
Family income levels also affect citizens’ personal financial evaluations.  Quite 
unexpectedly, however, higher levels of family income significantly decrease the likelihood 
of whites having positive perceptions of their financial prospects (p < .01). To a limited 
extent, this finding is supported in the literature.  In their study of citizens’ prospective 
evaluations of inflation and unemployment, Conover, Feldman, and Knight showed that 
income was negatively related to positive assessments of inflation.  However, these scholars 
also found that income increased the probability of having favorable assessments of 
unemployment (i.e., that it would be better in the future) (1987, 574). So while the effect of 
one’s family income on policy evaluations remains unclear, the results of the analysis here 
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suggest that individuals with higher family incomes adopt more conservative outlooks about 
their personal financial prospects. 
Age, too, dramatically decreases the likelihood of positive financial assessments. In 
addition to studies finding that age is negatively associated with positive evaluations of 
financial well-being (Feldman 1984), these results support other research showing that older 
individuals demonstrate less support for both reductions in federal income taxes and cuts in 
social security benefits (Lau and Sears 1981). 
The 1992 presidential election resulted in the defeat of incumbent Bush, a 
Republican.  President Bush’s defeat has been attributed to the mass perception of a stagnant 
economy, although this perception was divided largely along partisan lines. Thus, self-
identified Democrats may be less likely to have favorable financial outlooks since the 
president of their party had not yet taken office. 
Results show that Democrats, in fact, are significantly less likely to have favorable 
perceptions of their financial prospects (p < .01).  These results are consistent with previous 
studies showing that partisan predispositions influence economic perceptions (Wlezien, 
Franklin, and Twiggs 1997). In addition, partisanship, which is a stronger predictor of 
perceptions than education, appears to provide support for Gomez and Wilson’s research, 
which indicated that partisanship significantly predicts candidate preferences at all levels of 
political sophistication (2001, 908-909).   Finally, being married or a homeowner does not 
significantly influence one’s prospective financial perceptions. 
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TABLE 2.1 Individual Attributes and Perceptions of Financial Prospects 
  (Whites only) 
Variable 
Favorable Perceptions of 
Financial Prospects 
Education  .06* 
(.03) 
Family Income (ln) -.03** 
(.01) 
Age -.03** 
(.00) 
Homeowner (yes = 1) -.05 
(.12) 
Democrat -.23** 
(.06) 
Married -.03 
(.07) 
   
Log Likelihood -1470.61 
LR χ2 157.13 
Prob > χ2 .000 
N 1701 
_cut1 -4.47 
Notes: Ordered Logit model.  Standard errors in parentheses. ** p <  .01,  
* p < .05, one-tailed test 
Source: 1992 NES 
 
 
Testing how the components of the local economic context affect citizens’ 
prospective financial assessments requires a methodology whereby the relative effects of 
individuals’ attributes and the economic context on citizens’ financial perceptions may 
be determined. I use an ordered logit model to produce estimates of the relative effects 
of the local economic context on citizens’ prospective financial perceptions. 
Specifically, perceptions of personal financial prospects were estimated with (1) 
economic context variables, i.e., the visibility of business activity measure, workforce 
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competition, etc and (2) individuals’ attribute variables.  The results are presented in 
Table 2.2. 
None of the hypothesized relationships between the economic context measures 
and individuals’ perceptions of their financial prospects is supported by the analysis. 
Even more puzzling is the positive, yet insignificant, effect of unemployment on whites’ 
financial outlooks.  Only the size of workforce competition and the total number of local 
businesses are in the hypothesized directions, although they also lack statistical 
significance. 
Rather than the local economic context exerting any influence upon citizens’ 
financial outlooks, the results show that only educational attainment significantly increases 
individuals’ probability of positive financial outlooks (p < .05).  However, family income 
and age continue to decrease this likelihood (p < .01, respectively).  Thus, an initial analysis 
of the data indicates that citizens’ positive assessments of their financial prospects are 
almost exclusively determined by their educational attainment. 
To further examine these results, I calculated individual predicted probabilities using 
Long’s Spost program for interpreting nonlinear models (see Long and Freese 2003 for 
details).  Setting the values of the independent variables of different ideal types while all 
other variables are held at their means reveals a more nuanced relationship between the 
economic context, individuals’ attributes, and their financial perceptions. 
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TABLE 2.2 Economic Context and Perceptions of Financial Prospects 
  (Whites only) 
Variable 
Favorable 
Perceptions of 
Financial Prospects Δ  Pr(Better) 
Visibility of Business 
Activity 
-.00 
(.00) 
- 18% 
 
Workforce Competition -.02 
(.03) 
- 9% 
Education  .07* 
(.03) 
  9% 
Family Income (ln) -.03** 
(.01) 
- 21% 
Age -.03** 
(.00) 
- 44% 
Homeowner (yes = 1) -.06 
(.12) 
- 1% 
Urban (msa)  .11 
(.12) 
  2% 
Unemployed (1990)  .02 
(.02) 
  5% 
Business Activity  .00 
(.00) 
  52% 
Workforce population (18 – 
64) 
-.00 
(.00) 
- 29% 
County Size (sqmi) -.00 
(.00) 
- 10% 
    
Log Likelihood -1482.951  
LR χ2 153.00  
Prob > χ2 .000  
N 1711  
_cut1 -4.20  
Notes: Ordered Logit model.  Standard errors in parentheses. ** p <  .01,  
* p < .05, one-tailed test 
Source: 1992 NES; 1992 Economic Census 
 
 
The regression models show that education has the most significant effect on an 
individual’s likelihood of having positive financial outlooks.  However, predicting the 
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values based upon hypothetical types of citizens reveal that outlooks of one’s financial 
prospects are affected by the local economic context.  
As shown in Table 2.3, a 35-year old with a high school diploma who is earning 
between $40,000 and $44,999 has a 36% probability of assessing his or her financial 
prospects as better, all else being equal.  When the income is reduced to between $15,000 
and $16,999 but the visibility of business activity is increased by one standard deviation, a 
35-year old with a high school diploma has a 40% probability of having a favorable 
financial outlook with all other variables held at the mean.  The likelihood of such 
perceptions increases by another 7% when the total number of businesses is increased.  It is 
noteworthy that the average citizen, based upon these data, has a 32% chance of having 
positive financial outlooks.   
Further, some leverage may be gained on why education has such a powerful effect 
upon the likelihood of positive financial outlooks by adjusting our ideal citizen to have a 
Bachelor’s degree rather than a high school diploma.  Compared to a 35-year old with a high 
school diploma in a community with a greater total number of businesses, a 35-year old with 
a Bachelor’s degree in the same environment has a 52% likelihood of having positive 
financial outlooks; a full .20 greater probability than the average citizen. 
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TABLE 2.3 Ideal Types and Probability of Favorable Financial Outlooks 
Ideal Type Pr(better) 
35-year old with a high school diploma earning 
between $40,000 and $45,000 (all else held at 
the mean) 
0.36 
35-year old with a high school diploma earning 
between $15,000 and $17,000 in community 
with greater visibility of business activity (all 
else held at the mean) 
0.40 
35-year old with a high school diploma in 
community with a greater total number of 
businesses (all else held at the mean) 
0.47 
35-year old with a Bachelor’s degree in 
community with a greater total number of 
businesses (all else held at the mean) 
0.52 
An “average” citizen 0.32 
 
 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
While some scholarly debate exists about the motivations and orientations of voters’ 
attitudes and decisions, it is nonetheless clear that macroeconomic factors are significant 
influences such behavior (e.g., Alvarez, Nagler, and Bowler 2000; Clarke and Stewart 
1994; Lewis-Beck 1986, 1988; Uslaner 1989).  Still, national studies of voters’ attitudes 
and choices have not accounted for the effects of economic conditions on citizens’ 
attitudes within local communities. Moreover, “in considering the nature of national and 
regional growth there is a great variance between regional economic patterns and those 
for the nation as a whole during the last several hundred years” (Thomas 1969, 45; but 
see Hendrick and Garand 1991 for variations in state, regional, and national influences 
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on states’ economic growth patterns). Yet, contextual studies have largely failed to 
account for the local economic conditions in which citizens live. 
 The purpose of this chapter has been to, first, evaluate the extent to which local 
economic factors influence citizens’ perceptions of their financial prospects and, second, 
to offer an alternative conceptual framework in which to evaluate such perceptions.  
Rather than framing the discussion in terms of personal or collective, prospective or 
retrospective, the purview of this chapter has been to establish the effects of the local 
economic context on citizens’ prospective financial outlooks. 
 In addition to individual attributes, most of which have statistically significant 
effects on the likelihood with which citizens will have positive financial outlooks, 
greater visibility of business activity and a greater number of total businesses also may, 
substantively, increase individuals’ probability of having positive prospective financial 
perceptions, although the empirical effects are marginal at best. Still, while the results 
presented here are far from conclusive, one general conclusion is that the effects of 
socioeconomic attributes, especially education, on individuals’ financial outlooks should 
be considered, based on substantive patters observed in Table 2.3, in conjunction with 
the local economic environment in which individuals live. Of course, the question of 
whether such economic conditions and financial perceptions are strong enough to propel 
citizens to become voters is the topic of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
PERCEPTIONS OF FINANCIAL PROSPECTS AND POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION 
Chapter II showed that individual attributes, such as education, exert a strong influence 
on the probability with which citizens will have more favorable perceptions of their 
financial prospects. In this chapter, I argue that citizens’ perceptions of their financial 
prospects affect their likelihood of participation. I begin with a brief review of the 
relevant literature showing the importance of individuals’ socioeconomic attributes as 
determinants of their political behavior.  This is followed by a consideration of the 
literature on economic perceptions and individuals’ political decisions based upon such 
perceptions. Hypotheses derived from these considerations are then empirically tested 
and the results discussed. 
Mass Political Participation 
As observed in Chapter I, the importance of socioeconomic status as a predictor of 
political participation among whites has been firmly established by scholars. As 
Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980, 24) state, “education has a very powerful independent 
effect on the likelihood of voting” among whites. Over the years, a number of empirical 
studies have demonstrated that whites with higher levels of socioeconomic status tend to 
participate in political activities more than whites with lower levels of socioeconomic 
status (Conway 1985; Teixeira 1987; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). 
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Scholars of mass political participation have found that higher levels of 
socioeconomic status are significantly associated with political interest, which is a strong 
predictor of voting (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Bennett and Resnick 
1990).  In addition, “individuals of higher social status develop such civic orientations as 
concern for politics, information, and feelings of efficacy, and these orientations lead to 
political participation” (Verba and Nie 1972, 126).  
Perhaps the most extensive consideration of why socioeconomic status is 
consistently associated with political participation is the work of Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady (1995).  These scholars’ resources theory, which is comprised of time, skills, and 
money, postulates that individuals with such resources are more likely to participate than 
those without time, skills, or money since the absence of such resources increases the 
costs of political activity. 
Financial Perceptions and Political Participation 
Surprisingly little research exists on how financial perceptions affect one’s propensity to 
engage in political activities.  Studies of economic voting have demonstrated that voters’ 
economic perceptions are a key component of presidential approval (Brooks and Brady 
1999; Chappell, Jr. 1990; Clarke and Stewart 1994; Funk and Garcia-Monet 1997; 
MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992; Norpoth 1996), presidential economic 
performance (Conover and Feldman 1986; Lau and Sears 1981) and vote choice (Alford 
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and Legge, Jr. 1984; Gomez and Wilson 2001; Sigelman 1991; Wlezien, Franklin and 
Twiggs 1997).18 
 These studies have nearly always focused on the attitudes and choices of voters.  
As a result, research has tended to be motivated by theories of accountability of elected 
officials, citing the democratic function of elections as one of empowering citizens to 
hold elected officials accountable for the general state of the economy: voters either 
reward or punish incumbents for their actions while in office.  As noted by Kuklinski 
and West (1981), “nothing is more fundamental to popular control than the idea that 
citizens hold officials accountable for their collective actions” (437). 
By and large, studies of economic voting (i.e., assessments of “changes in vote 
probabilities due to changing economic perceptions” (Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 
2004, 4)19 ) in both presidential and congressional elections have shown that a growing 
or stable economic environment has helped incumbent party candidates while economic 
decline benefited candidates of the opposition (Kuklinski and West 1981; see also 
Erikson 1989; Jacobson and Kernell 1992; Kramer 1971; Tufte 1975). 
While the question of whether financial perceptions affect political participation 
appears to have received little attention in the scholarly literature, the negative effects of 
individuals’ adverse financial conditions on their political behavior have been 
                                                
18 Alternatively, scholars have considered how citizens form their economic judgments (Conover, 
Feldman, and Knight 1987). 
19 A more thorough definition is provided by Gábor Tóka: Economic voting is an expression referring to a 
behavioural phenomena, namely that changes in economic conditions or in their perception (supposedly) 
lead to changes in individual voting preferences and via that in election outcomes. Voting merely on the 
ground of economic ideology is not economic voting in the above sense” (nd). 
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extensively evaluated (Brody and Sniderman 1977; Fiorina 1978; Rosenstone 1982; 
Schlozman and Verba 1979). 
In sum, research within the economic voting literature has provided consistent 
evidence that economic perceptions affect voters’ attitudes and choices.  In addition, 
adverse financial circumstances decrease individuals’ likelihood of voting (Rosenstone 
1982). Based upon the findings within both the economic voting and political 
participation literatures, I hypothesize that citizens’ prospective financial perceptions 
affect the likelihood with which they will participate.  More specifically, citizens with 
positive financial assessments will be more likely to participate than those with less 
favorable financial outlooks. 
 This hypothesis is predicated upon previous research showing voters’ financial 
outlooks as well as personal financial conditions (e.g., Rosenstone 1982) influence their 
political behavior.  Since personal economic adversity decreases turnout due not only to 
the physical challenges associated with economic difficulties (Brody and Sniderman 
1977; Rosenstone 1982) but also the psychological component of economic troubles, I 
expect less positive financial outlooks to decrease one’s likelihood to engage in political 
activities since such outlooks may depress one’s ability to pay attention to political 
issues, even if such issues have potential relevance to the disadvantaged individual.  
Results and Analysis 
Individuals’ socioeconomic status significantly increases the probability with which they 
will engage in various political activities (see Table 3.1-A in the appendix).  Education is 
consistently the strongest predictor of voting, persuading others, displaying political 
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statements, attending political events, and contributing money.  Education also increases 
the probability of civic engagement through increasing the likelihood with which one 
does volunteer work or joins a community organization to try to solve a local problem.  
These findings are consistent with previous studies of political participation that have 
repeatedly shown that education is linked to multiple political activities (Verba and Nie 
1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). 
Scholars have postulated several reasons for the link between education and 
voting. Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) found that males with higher education 
levels demonstrated more interest in the 1948 presidential campaign. Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone (1980), Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995), and others attribute the effects 
of education on the likelihood of voting to the skills associated with education that make 
learning about politics easier and more gratifying. 
Individuals with higher family income levels are also more likely to engage in a 
variety of political activities.  Higher family income significantly increases the 
probability with which individuals of such families will vote or make political 
contributions.  Income also increases the probability that individuals will be active 
within their community.  However, consistent with previous research, the relationship 
between income and political activity is not as strong as that of educational attainment 
(e.g., Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). 
 While citizens who identify themselves as upper class are more likely to vote, 
work on political campaigns, and make contributions, social class is not significantly 
related to the other forms of political participation considered here.  To check whether 
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the inconsistency observed may be due to underlying correlation issues, I examined the 
extent to which these factors overlap.  While social class and education (corr. =. 41), 
social class and income (corr. = .40), and income and education (corr. = .46) are 
somewhat correlated, their levels are not believed to be problematic. 
 Previous studies have shown, when it comes to voting, that education and age 
were of primary importance (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).  Results here appear to 
support these prior studies: as people age, they are more likely to vote, contribute 
money, and be active in solving community problems. However, older citizens are 
significantly less likely to try to persuade others’ votes (p = .00) or display their political 
preferences (p < .05) 
 Whites identifying themselves as either strong Democrats or strong Republicans 
are also more likely to be active in almost every respect, except working for a political 
campaign, contributing money, or volunteering work.  However, strong partisans are 
significantly less likely to join an organization to try to solve a community problem, 
although the relationship is relatively weak (p < .05).   
 Consistent with previous research demonstrating that gender differences in 
voting behavior have largely disappeared, no significant difference exists between males 
and females when it comes to voting, displaying political sentiments, attending political 
functions, or working on a political campaign.  However, males are significantly more 
likely to make financial contributions and try to persuade others’ votes (p < .01). The 
results of individual political participation measures and predicted probabilities are 
presented in Tables 3.2-A through 3.7-A located in the appendix. 
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 The results of these data support what has been well established in the 
participation literature: socioeconomic status, age, and strong partisanship all positively 
affect the likelihood of being politically active. 
  
TABLE 3.1 Financial Perceptions and Individually and Socially Based Political 
  Participation (Whites Only) 
Independent Variable 
Index of Individually Based 
Participation 
Index of Socially Based 
Participation 
Perceptions of Financial 
Prospects 
.03 
(.09) 
-.18* 
(.08) 
Education .35*** 
(.04) 
.31*** 
(.04) 
Family income .06*** 
(.01) 
.03** 
(.01) 
Social Class .14 
(.09) 
.02 
(.09) 
Age .02*** 
(.00) 
.01** 
(.00) 
Male .07 
(.10) 
.01 
(.10) 
Strong Partisans .31*** 
(.06) 
-.03 
(.06) 
Log Likelihood -1527.91 -1737.99 
LR χ2 309.68 156.65 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 
Observations 1617 1615 
Notes: Ordered logit estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance based on one-tailed p-
values. *** p = .000 ** p < .01 * p < .05 
Source: 1992 NES. 
 
 
 
 Individuals’ attributes were also shown to influence the likelihood with which 
citizens will have positive perceptions of their financial prospects (Chapter III, Table 1).  
In this chapter, I hypothesize that, when controlling for individual attributes, citizens 
with more positive perceptions of their financial prospects are more likely to be 
politically active than citizens with less positive financial outlooks (H1).  In the interest 
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of brevity, the results of individually and socially based political activity are reported 
and discussed here as opposed to evaluating the influence of such perceptions upon each 
measure of political participation (e.g., vote, display, contact, volunteer, contribute, etc.).   
 Consistent with the separate measures of participation, individuals’ perceptions 
of their financial prospects fail to influence the likelihood of engaging in individually 
based political activities, as shown in Table 3.1.  Also consistent with individual 
measures of political activity, individuals with more favorable outlooks are significantly 
less likely to participate in socially based political activities (p < .05).  Once again, 
socioeconomic attributes continue to significantly and positively influence the likelihood 
of engaging in these types of participation. Interestingly, while strong partisans are more 
likely to be involved in individually based political activities (p = .00), strong 
partisanship is not significantly related to socially based participation.  As Table 3.2 
shows, all else being equal, an increase in the standard deviation of individuals’ 
perceptions decreases citizens’ likelihood of engaging in social political activities by a 
slight 2%.   
On the one hand, research on political participation has shown that economic 
adversity decreases one’s likelihood of voting.  Scholars have attributed such findings to 
either the physical hardships or psychological aspects of economic adversity (Brody and 
Sniderman 1977; Rosenstone 1982). Yet, on the other hand, it appears that those who 
have even favorable financial outlooks (regardless of current economic condition) are 
also less likely to be active in socially based political activities.  This raises the question 
of who participates?  If neither those with negative economic conditions nor those with 
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positive financial outlooks are socially active, what accounts for social political 
engagement? 
 
TABLE 3.2 Financial Perceptions and Individuals’ Probability of Engaging In 
 One or More Individually and Socially Based Political Activities 
Perceptions of Financial Prospects 
Pr(At least one Individually 
Based Activity) 
Pr(At least one Socially 
Based Activity) 
Worse 0.84 0.50 
Same 0.85 0.46 
Better 0.86 0.43 
Mean 0.79 0.45 
Observations 1776 1776 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Source: 1992 NES. 
 
 
Previous research on the effects of financial perceptions has found that such 
perceptions significantly affect voters’ choices and political attitudes.  Yet, financial 
perceptions do not appear to affect whether citizens become politically active in the first 
place.  Moreover, such perceptions actually decrease the odds of being socially engaged. 
These findings raise questions about theories motivating economic voting studies, which 
have stressed the importance of holding elected officials accountable for economic 
conditions. Such theories imply that citizens, angered by their financial conditions, will 
become voters; thereby holding elected officials accountable. While personal financial 
perceptions may affect levels of candidate support through vote choice or attitude, it 
appears unlikely that such perceptions motivate citizens to become voters or otherwise 
politically active in the first place.  These findings also do not support the contention that 
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those with positive financial perceptions are more likely to participate due to any sense 
of receiving instrumental benefits. 
 Still, as scholars of the social context have asserted, the importance of 
individuals’ psychological and socioeconomic attributes need to be considered while 
taking into account the social environment in which the individual lives.  Where 
previous contextual scholars have primarily focused on aggregated socioeconomic 
attributes to conceptualize the local environment, I argue that the economic context is a 
crucial environmental factor in understanding how socioeconomic status influences 
individuals’ political behavior.  
Economic Context, Financial Prospects, and Participation 
While citizens’ financial outlooks continue to lack any statistically significant effect 
upon their probability of engaging in individually based political activities, workforce 
competition significantly influences citizens’ likelihood of participating in at least one 
such activity (p < .05).  This suggests that individuals are not significantly motivated to 
vote, contribute money, or display their political sentiments unless they feel vulnerable 
to workforce competition.  These results further suggest that those with higher 
educational attainment and incomes may be those who feel most threatened by such 
conditions, perhaps as a result of increased competition for fewer elite jobs. 
 As Table 3.3 reveals, when the economic measures are added to the socially 
based participation model, citizens’ perceptions of their financial prospects are no longer 
significant.  This result suggests that the effects of individuals’ perceptions on the 
likelihood of attending a political rally or meeting, volunteering work, or otherwise 
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involved with a community organization cannot be fully evaluated without some 
accounting of local economic conditions. 
 
TABLE 3.3 Financial Perceptions, Economic Context, and Individually 
  and Socially Based Political Participation (Whites Only) 
Independent Variable 
Index of 
Individually Based 
Participation 
Index of Socially 
Based Participation 
Perceptions of Financial 
Prospects 
.10 
(.12) 
-.14 
(.09) 
Visibility of Business 
Activity 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
.00 
Workforce Competition -.07* 
(.03) 
-.02 
.03 
Business Activity -.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
.00 
Education .53*** 
(.06) 
.31*** 
(.04) 
Family income .07*** 
(.01) 
.03** 
(.01) 
Social Class .12 
(.13) 
-.01 
(.09) 
Age .03*** 
(.00) 
.01* 
(.00) 
Male -.12 
(.14) 
.03 
(.11) 
Strong Partisans .45*** 
(.09) 
-.03 
(.07) 
Log Likelihood -663.60 -1027.79 
LR χ2 296.89 141.32 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 
Observations 1596 1593 
Notes: Ordered logit estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance based on one-tailed p-
values. *** p = .000 ** p < .01 * p < .05 
Source: 1992 NES. 
 
 
  The generally weak and inconsistent effects of individuals’ perceptions of their 
financial prospects and the local economic context upon whites’ political behavior stand 
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in stark contrast to the overwhelmingly consistent and significant effects of education, 
family income, age, and partisan strength on such behavior.  Higher levels of education, 
family income, age, and partisan strength consistently affect whites’ chances of being 
politically active.   
Summary and Conclusion 
While theoretical reasons exist for expecting otherwise, whites’ perceptions of their 
financial prospects simply do not account for much of their political behavior.  Yet some 
scholars have suggested such findings, in fact, are a sign of economic net worth.  In 
particular, the more prosperous the aggregate economic conditions, the less voters will 
be influenced by personal financial perceptions (Alford 1982, cited in Welch and Foster 
1992). 
Still, the findings presented in this chapter raise questions about previous 
research claiming that voters’ financial assessments have consequences for election 
outcomes and approval rates of elected leaders.  If citizens’ perceptions of their financial 
prospects do not significantly affect the probability with which they will engage in 
various political activities, why do such perceptions appear to play such a prominent role 
in voters’ vote decisions?  In addition to this intellectual conundrum, the analysis here 
also raises questions about theories of accountability.  That is, scholars of economic 
voting have asserted that voters, who are unhappy with economic conditions, 
presumably because economic decline hurts either the voter or society, punish 
incumbents by casting a vote for another candidate (or abstaining from the polls 
altogether). The results here do not necessarily challenge previous studies.  Rather, they 
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suggest, substantively, that citizens with positive financial outlooks are more likely to 
vote in the first place, which does raise the question of what circumstances would cause 
voters with positive financial outlooks to punish incumbents, if ever. 
The results presented here also raise issues relevant to studies of the social 
context.  In particular, why is there consistent evidence that the social context, when 
comprised of aggregated socioeconomic attributes such as education or class, affects 
residents’ political behavior but local economic conditions appear to exert little or no 
influence on political behavior?  Some leverage on this question might be gained after 
first examining the extent to which local economic conditions influence racial and ethnic 
minority groups’ perceptions of their financial prospects, the task to which I now turn.   
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CHAPTER IV 
RACIAL AND ETHNIC GROUPS’ PERCEPTIONS AND PARTICIPATION 
In Chapter II the local economic context was shown to exert only minimal statistical 
effects upon whites’ perceptions of their financial prospects and, as shown in Chapter 
III, such perceptions fail to account for individually or socially based political activity 
among whites when objective economic conditions are considered in the models. In this 
chapter, I examine, first, whether the local economic context influences black, Asian, 
and Latino citizens’ perceptions of their financial prospects similarly and, second, 
whether such perceptions influence the likelihood of political participation.  I begin with 
an evaluation of what is known about minority groups’ financial perceptions.  I then 
make the case for why the local economic context might differentially affect minority 
groups’ financial perceptions. This is followed by an overview of theories of racial and 
ethnic minorities political participation. Hypotheses derived from these discussions are 
then empirically tested and the results discussed. 
Minorities and Financial Perceptions 
Despite widespread public commentary on the economic conditions of racial and ethnic 
minority groups, surprisingly little research has been done to examine the effects of 
economic conditions, whether national or local, on minority groups’ financial 
perceptions.  Are blacks’ perceptions of their financial prospects shaped more by 
personal attributes or by the broader economic context in which they live? Do Asians, 
who as a group has the highest educational attainment and median income of any other 
group, have more positive financial outlooks despite the widespread social 
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discrimination they also encounter? These are just a sampling of the questions that might 
be better answered by, first, establishing what the financial perceptions are of racial and 
ethnic minority group members and, second, gaining some leverage on factors 
contributing to such perceptions.  
Of the handful of studies addressing minorities’ financial perceptions, most have 
focused on political attitudes and vote choices.  Moreover, the sole minority group of 
study appears to be blacks.  Still, this line of research shows that income levels affect 
blacks’ partisan identification, presidential support, and attitudes regarding progress on 
civil rights (Parent and Stekler 1985, 527-529).  Other research demonstrates blacks’ 
vote choices are influenced by perceptions of national economic conditions (Welch and 
Foster 1992). 
The Local Economic Context and Minorities’ Financial Perceptions 
Despite the plethora of research assessing whites’ political responses to the social 
environment (Foladare 1968; Giles and Dantico 1982; Huckfeldt 1979, 1980, 1984; 
Huckfeldt, Pluzer, and Sprague 1993; Kenny 1992; Weatherford 1982, 1983; Wright, Jr. 
1976), political scientists have largely neglected consideration of how the political 
behavior of racial and ethnic minorities is influenced by the social context.  Yet little 
reason exists to expect minority citizens’ political behavior to be any less affected by 
their particular social environments.  
In fact, since some groups disproportionately inhabit communities rife with 
social, political, and economic problems, it seems plausible that residents of such 
communities might be more affected by the social context…and more likely to be 
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politically active.  In other words, those with less positive perceptions of their financial 
prospects might be expected to participate more as a result of such perceptions (the 
“mobilizing” perspective; see Rosenstone 1982).  Further, there is some evidence 
suggesting that individuals who believed a particular problem was related to their 
ethnicity were more likely to work in a civic group, contact an official, or contact the 
news media (Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989). 
 Understanding the economic conditions minority citizens are likely to see 
warrants an examination of what is known about their residential patterns since the 
opportunities available to them are largely dependent upon where they live (Massey 
2000).  In addition, “the way that a group is spatially incorporated in a city is as 
important for its socioeconomic well-being as the manner in which it is incorporated in 
the labor force” (ibid. 45).  Different groups experience varying levels of residential 
segregation, which is the extent to which a particular spatial unit is comprised of a 
particular group.20 
 Blacks, as a group, have the highest levels of residential segregation of any of the 
four “umbrella” racial and ethnic groups in the United States, meaning that blacks are 
disproportionately likely to live in overwhelming black neighborhoods.  These high 
levels of residential segregation, according to Massey, “imply a restriction on the 
opportunities and resources available to African Americans in comparison with other 
groups” (2000, 45). For blacks, scores of segregation increased steadily between 1970 
and 1990 while, for Latinos, there is tremendous regional variation. While Latinos have 
                                                
20 For a discussion on measurements of residential segregation, see Jaret 1995; Massey and Denton 1988. 
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more moderate scores of residential segregation than blacks, scholars nonetheless 
attribute the group’s relatively high levels of segregation to the “large size and rapid 
growth of the Hispanic population” (Massey 2000, 53).  For Asians, however, “despite 
rapid immigration and population growth, Asian segregation levels remained quite 
moderate in 1990” (ibid. 55).  The pattern among Asians is attributed to the initial small 
population size: “where a sudden massive immigration overwhelms a small established 
community, levels of segregation often decline initially as new arrivals distribute 
themselves widely and then rise as these pioneers attract subsequent settlers to the same 
area” (ibid. 55). 
 Thus, minority groups experience varying degrees of residential segregation, and 
this segregation significantly reduces the economic and social opportunities available to 
them. Massey and Denton assert that the urban ghetto “represents the key institutional 
arrangement ensuring the continued subordination of blacks in the United States” (1993, 
18).  According to these scholars, early twentieth century ethnic enclaves such as 
“Jewish,” “Polish,” or “Italian” neighborhoods differed from black ghettos since earlier 
immigrant enclaves were never homogenous, always contained a wide variety of 
nationalities, and were “a fleeting, transitory stage in the process of immigrant 
assimilation” (ibid. 33). The permanency of the black ghetto in American society, 
marked by densely populated vertical public housing projects and economic as well as 
social isolation, has brought about a “a geographic concentration of poverty that was 
previously unimaginable” (ibid. 57). 
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 Residential patterns of minority groups have very real consequences for their 
perceptions of their financial prospects.  Not only is race an important factor in hiring 
decisions but “it is race in a complex interaction with employers’ perceptions of class 
and space, or inner-city residence” that affects employment (Kirschenman and 
Neckerman 1991, 204).  Inner-city residency communicates an array of signals to 
employers.  The term, according to employers, connotes “black, poor, uneducated, 
unskilled, lacking in values, crime, gangs, drugs, and unstable families” (ibid. 215).   
 Although Latino and Asian groups have lower residential segregation scores than 
blacks, these groups nonetheless experience lower employment opportunities than 
whites (Kirschenman and Neckerman 1991).  Perhaps to offset the negative effects of 
workplace discrimination and other barriers to economic integration, Asians and some 
Latino subgroups (i.e., Cubans), have developed economic enclaves.  An enclave is “a 
concentration of ethnic firms in physical space – generally metropolitan area – that 
employ a significant proportion of workers from the same minority” (Portes and Jensen 
1992, cited in Waters and Eschbach 1995, 437-438).  While some studies have shown an 
overrepresentation of immigrants in entrepreneurial activities (Aldrich and Waldinger 
1990; Waldinger 1986, 1989; Waldinger, Aldrich, and Ward 1990), others have shown 
all minority groups to be significantly less likely to be self-employed (Butler and 
Herring 1991). Still, some research has demonstrated the importance of small-business 
ownership as a channel of intergenerational educational mobility among Chinese 
Americans (Sanchirico 1991). 
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 The large proportion of blacks residing in ghettos and the attendant 
disadvantages of such neighborhoods suggests that blacks’ economic contexts are 
structurally different from those of other groups.  In other words, the high levels of 
residential segregation of blacks imply that individuals within this group live in areas 
that should depress their financial outlooks.  In particular, I hypothesize that the local 
economic context will reduce the probability of blacks having more favorable financial 
outlooks. Although Latinos and Asians experience more moderate levels of residential 
segregation and there is some evidence suggesting that these groups have compensated 
for reduced economic opportunities through developing ethnic enclaves, the results of 
such studies are inconclusive.  As such, the hypothesis that the local economic context is 
expected to have a positive effect on Latino and Asians’ perceptions of their financial 
prospects is largely based on their more moderate levels of residential segregation, 
which suggests these groups are exposed to greater economic opportunity than are 
blacks but still not as much as are whites. 
Research on the effects of economic perceptions has found blacks were 
influenced by “their perceptions of the economic fortunes of blacks as a group and of the 
nation as a whole” (Welch and Foster 1992, 232). While this is a very weak foundation 
upon which to establish broad expectations of other minority group’s behavior, it does 
suggest that citizens of a minority background base their prospective financial 
perceptions not only on their personal financial conditions but also on the group’s 
economic situation.  As such, prospective financial perceptions of individuals within 
particular racial and ethnic minority groups may be influenced more by their particular 
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group’s economic context than by the general economic context.  In other words, blacks’ 
(Asians’ or Latinos’) perceptions of their personal financial prospects may be more 
strongly influenced by the visibility of black-owned (or Asian- or Latino-owned) 
businesses than by the visibility of all businesses within the local economic context.   
In sum, previous research has shown that living in areas of economic decline can 
lead to more pessimistic economic outlooks (Weatherford 1983). Results of previous 
studies are based on white sample populations and, as such, we do not how racial and 
ethnic minority individuals respond to economic conditions.  Still, given the levels of 
residential segregation prevalent among minority groups one would expect less positive 
perceptions of one’s financial prospects for individuals within these groups.  Moreover, 
based on evidence suggesting minority citizens incorporate into their financial 
perceptions group economic circumstances, the effects of one’s group economic 
conditions should exert as strong or stronger an influence than the general local 
economic context on such perceptions. Specifically, the following hypotheses are tested: 
H1:  Among minority group members, greater visibility of business activity will 
increase positive perceptions of individuals’ financial prospects whereas lower 
levels of visibility of business activity will result in less positive perceptions of 
financial prospects, controlling for socioeconomic attributes and individual 
characteristics. 
 
H2:  When controlling for socioeconomic and individual attributes, minority 
group members’ perceptions of their financial prospects will be influenced 
equal to or more by the group’s economic condition than by the general 
visibility of business activity. 
 
Results and Analysis 
Before assessing the influence of the economic context upon racial and ethnic groups’ 
perceptions of their financial prospects, the effects of socioeconomic attributes upon 
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such perceptions are first considered. When controlling for race and ethnicity, higher 
levels of educational attainment significantly increase the probability of having more 
favorable financial outlooks.  In addition, older citizens and homeowners are 
considerably less likely to have positive perceptions of their financial prospects (p < .01, 
respectively).  Most surprising, each of the racial and ethnic minority groups is 
significantly more likely to assess their financial prospects more favorably than are 
whites.  
Minorities’ Financial Perceptions 
Whites and Hispanics are significantly less likely to have favorable financial outlooks as 
the visibility of business activity increases (p < .06 and p < .05, respectively).  As shown 
in Table 4.1, workforce competition, while in the expected negative direction for all 
models, except Asian, fails to have a significant effect upon any of the racial or ethnic 
groups’ perceptions of their financial prospects.  The total number of businesses within 
the community rather than the visibility of such businesses, however, significantly 
influences Asians’ perceptions.  Further, as the sheer population between the ages of 18 
and 64 increases, Asians’ probability of positive financial outlooks decreases. 
 The effects of socioeconomic status attributes on racial and ethnic groups’ 
financial perceptions vary.  Educational attainment has a positive effect on the likelihood 
that individuals across racial and ethnic groups will have positive perceptions.  However, 
it reaches statistical significance only for whites (p < .001) and blacks (p < .05).   
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TABLE 4.1 Economic Context and Minorities’ Perceptions of Financial 
  Prospects 
 
Model 1 
Hispanic 
PFP 
Black 
PFP 
Asian 
PFP 
Anglo 
PFP 
Visibility of 
Business Activity 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.01* 
(0.01) 
 0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
Workforce 
Competition 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Total number of 
businesses 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.00** 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Education  0.15*** 
(0.04) 
 0.03 
(0.09) 
 0.20* 
(0.11) 
 0.04 
(0.10) 
 0.30*** 
(0.08) 
Household 
Income 
 0.00 
(0.03) 
0.07 
(0.07) 
-0.02 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
 0.02 
(0.06) 
Age2  0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.00** 
(0.00) 
Own home -0.38*** 
(0.11) 
-0.61** 
(0.23) 
-0.23 
(0.22) 
-0.47* 
(0.26) 
-0.05 
(0.23) 
Urban  0.17 
(0.19) 
 0.42 
(0.40) 
-1.10* 
(0.53) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.15 
(0.29) 
County Size 
(in sqmi) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Population size: 
18 – 64 
 -0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00** 
(0.00) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
Unemployment -0.11 
(1.52) 
0.78 
(1.83) 
-8.08 
(7.54) 
 8.78 
(6.61) 
-12.48* 
(6.10) 
Asian  0.51*** 
(0.14) 
    
Black  0.26* 
(0.14) 
    
Hispanic  0.75*** 
(0.15) 
    
__cut 1 -6.24 -11.02 3.08 -53.42 17.93 
Log Likelihood -1579.23 -371.41 -385.55 -315.83 -449.53 
LR  χ2 (11) 194.31 22.42 46.02 33.83 84.39 
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0331 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 
Observations 1830 474 437 425 472 
Notes: Ordered logit estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance based on one-tailed p-
values. *** p = .000 ** p < .01 * p < .05.  Urban variable measured with MSA in Hispanic, black, and 
Anglo models.  It is measured with the percent of the population ages 18-64 in Asian model. 
Source: 1992 Economic Census: Survey of Minority-Owned Business Enterprises; 1995 Texas Minority 
Survey. 
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 Still, none of the group’s financial perceptions is considerably influenced by 
household income, although blacks and Asians appear to be somewhat less likely to have 
favorable outlooks as their incomes increase.  Strong inferences based on these results, 
however, are unwarranted due to the lack of significance. 
 As whites age they are substantially more likely to assess their financial 
prospects more favorably.  While the coefficients for Hispanics and blacks are 
insignificant, they are positive. Homeownership continues to have a negative and 
significant effect upon the probability with which Hispanics (p < .01) and Asians (p < 
.05) will have positive financial outlooks.  This suggests that, while these two ethnic 
groups may be able to buy a home, they also experience some degree of anxiety about 
their ability to maintain such a standard of living.  It is noteworthy that the estimates for 
whites and blacks, too, are negative, although, once again, not statistically significant. 
 As the extant literature would suggest, living in an urban area decreases blacks’ 
probability of having positive financial perceptions (p < .05).   This finding indicates that 
blacks’ urban living conditions, such as residential segregation, significantly affect their 
financial outlooks.  Living in an urban area fails to significantly influence any of the 
other groups. 
Group-Specific Economic Contexts and Perceptions of Financial Prospects 
Previous research has suggested the financial perceptions of racial and ethnic minorities 
may be influenced not only by broader economic concerns but also by one’s group 
economic status (Welch and Foster 1992).  Based on this research, it was hypothesized 
that the financial perceptions of members of racial and ethnic groups would be 
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influenced as much as, or more, by the group’s economic context than by the general 
economic context. As Table 4.2 reveals, support for this hypothesis is mixed. 
 While the financial prospects of Hispanics are influenced by the visibility of 
Hispanic-owned business activity, the effect is negative.  So, on the one hand, greater 
visibility of Hispanic-owned business activity decreases the probability that Hispanic 
individuals will assess their future financial conditions as better.  On the other hand, 
Hispanics living in urban areas with greater number of Hispanic-owned businesses are 
significantly more likely to have positive financial outlooks.  These results suggest that 
an increased density of Hispanic-owned businesses may indicate greater levels of 
residential segregation and that residents of such communities recognize the limited 
economic opportunities available to them.  
 None of the group-economic context measures plays a significant role in blacks’ 
prospective financial outlooks.  Educational attainment continues to have the strongest 
effect upon the likelihood of blacks’ assessing their financial futures as better (p < .05).  
Blacks living in urban areas, too, continue to be less likely to have positive financial 
perceptions. These results support previous research suggesting individuals “combine 
information about personal and local conditions to form subjective impressions of family 
financial situation and of the trend of national business conditions” (Weatherford 1983, 
884). It may be that the lack of effect of the black economic context on blacks’ financial 
outlooks suggests black individuals rely upon urban living conditions as summary 
measures of their group’s economic situation. 
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TABLE 4.2 Group-Specific Local Economic Context and Minorities’ Perceptions 
 of Financial Prospects 
 
Hispanics’ 
PFP 
Blacks’ 
PFP 
Asians’ 
PFP 
Anglos’ 
PFP 
Group’s Visibility of 
Business Activity 
-0.10*** 
(0.04) 
 0.06 
(0.08) 
 0.08 
(0.08) 
-0.01** 
(0.01) 
Education  0.02 
(0.09) 
 0.19* 
(0.11) 
 0.04 
(0.10) 
 0.30*** 
(0.08) 
Household Income 0.08 
(0.07) 
-0.02 
(0.07) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
Age2 0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.00** 
(0.00) 
Own home -0.60** 
(0.23) 
-0.24 
(0.21) 
-0.49* 
(0.25) 
-0.06 
(0.23) 
Urban  0.57* 
(0.28) 
-0.61* 
(0.36) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.31 
(0.24) 
Number of Group-
Owned Firms 
 0.00** 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.00** 
(0.00) 
County size 
(in sqmi) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Unemployment  0.56 
(1.73) 
-8.33 
(7.46) 
 4.71 
(5.54) 
-10.59 
 (5.91) 
__cut 1 -2.85 -4.62 -3.41 -4.63 
Log Likelihood -369.18 -386.22 -317.89 -450.34 
LR  χ2 (12) 26.88 44.67 29.70 82.76 
Prob > χ2 0.0027 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 
Observations 474 437 425 472 
Notes: Ordered logit estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance based on one-tailed p-
values. *** p = .000 ** p < .01 * p < .05. Urban variable measured with MSA in Hispanic, black, and 
Anglo models.  It is measured with the percent of the population ages 18-64 in Asian model. 
Source: 1992 Economic Census: Survey of Minority-Owned Business Enterprises; 1995 Texas Minority 
Survey. 
 
 
 The visibility of Asian-owned business activity does not significantly influence 
Asians’ prospective financial perceptions.  The primary influence upon such perceptions 
for this group continues to be whether the respondent owns a home (p < .05).  
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Individuals’ socioeconomic attributes also fail to exert much influence on Asians’ 
financial perceptions.  Thus, regardless of the personal or social benefits of ethnic 
enclaves, such enclaves do not appear to influence Asians’ perceptions of their financial 
prospects. 
Whites’ financial perceptions are less likely to be positive as the group’s 
visibility of business activity increases (p < .01).  However, as with Hispanics, the total 
number of white-owned businesses positively influences this group’s financial 
perceptions.  In addition, greater levels of educational attainment increase the probability 
with which whites will assess their financial futures as better.  Age, too, continues to 
factor prominently into whether whites will have positive perceptions. 
These results must be ingested with some caution since likelihood ratio tests 
indicate that white-, Asian-, and black-visibility of business activity measures are not 
statistically different from zero.  As such, the null hypothesis that the respective group’s 
visibility of business activity does not influence financial perceptions cannot be rejected.  
Only the visibility of Hispanic-owned businesses is statistically different from zero (LR 
chi(1)=9.25; p>chi=.01), meaning the null can be rejected and one can, with relative 
confidence, assert that the effects of the visibility of Hispanic-owned businesses on 
Hispanics’ financial perceptions is significant. 
An examination of whether the prospective financial perceptions of blacks, 
Asians, Hispanics, and whites are influenced more by their group’s visibility of business 
activity or by the general visibility of business activity reveals some intriguing results.  
As shown in Table 4.3, the visibility of Hispanic-owned business activity continues to 
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reduce the probability of Hispanics having more favorable financial outlooks. The 
visibility of general business activity, while positive, fails to be a significant factor. 
Moreover, these measures are statistically different, as indicated by Wald tests of 
significance (chi2(2)=7.19; p > chi= .03). Hispanics’ perceptions of their financial 
prospects continue to be positively influenced by the total number of Hispanic-owned 
firms, rather than the visibility of such businesses.  While homeownership continues to 
decrease Hispanics’ likelihood of positive financial outlooks, results also indicate that 
Hispanics who live in urban areas with greater amounts of Hispanic-owned businesses 
are significantly more likely to have positive financial outlooks. 
Blacks’ perceptions of their financial prospects are neither significantly 
influenced by the visibility of black-owned businesses nor by the general visibility of 
business activity.  Once again, such perceptions among blacks are significantly 
influenced by educational attainment (p < .05) and living in an urban area (p < .05). 
These results are consistent with earlier analysis of the effects of the local economic 
context on blacks’ financial perceptions.  Still, one problem is that the visibility of black-
owned businesses is not statistically distinguishable from the general visibility of 
business activity (chi2(2) = .17; p > chi = .92).  This problem may be the result of a 
heavy concentration of black-owned businesses in black neighborhoods.  An unexplored 
potential consequence, then, of high levels of residential segregation is the economic 
concentration of a group and what it means for the group’s economic advancement. 
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TABLE 4.3 Group-Specific Versus General Economic Contexts and 
 Minorities’ Financial Outlooks 
 
Hispanics’ 
PFP 
Blacks’ 
PFP 
Asians’ 
PFP 
Anglos’ 
PFP 
Group’s Visibility of 
Business Activity 
-0.10*** 
(0.04) 
 -0.11 
(0.19) 
0.40* 
(0.20) 
-0.01** 
(0.01) 
Visibility of Business 
Activity 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01* 
(0.01) 
 0.03 
(0.03) 
Education  0.02 
(0.09) 
 0.18* 
(0.11) 
 0.04 
(0.10) 
 0.29*** 
(0.08) 
Household Income 0.08 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.07) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
 -0.01 
(0.06) 
Age2  0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.00** 
(0.00) 
Own home -0.59*** 
(0.23) 
-0.23 
(0.21) 
-0.58** 
(0.26) 
-0.05 
(0.23) 
Urban  0.56* 
(0.29) 
-0.68* 
(0.37) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.31 
(0.24) 
Number of Group-
Owned Firms 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
County size 
(in sqmi) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Unemployment  0.62 
(1.78) 
-8.81 
(7.43) 
 5.98 
(5.91) 
-11.96* 
(6.12) 
__cut 1 -2.84 -4.70 -3.73 -4.79 
Log Likelihood -369.17 -385.75 -316.38 -449.96 
LR  χ2 (12) 26.90 45.61 32.73 83.51 
Prob > χ2 0.0048 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 
Observations 474 437 425 472 
 Notes: Ordered logit estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance based on one-tailed p-
values. *** p = .000 ** p < .01 * p < .05. Urban variable measured with MSA in Hispanic, black, and 
Anglo models.  It is measured with the percent of the population ages 18-64 in Asian model. 
Source: 1992 Economic Census: Survey of Minority-Owned Business Enterprises; 1995 Texas Minority 
Survey. 
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When the effects of the visibility of Asian-owned firms on their perceptions of 
financial prospects are evaluated with the general visibility of business activity, a 
strikingly different picture emerges on what influences this group’s financial outlooks.  
Asians’ financial perceptions are significantly and positively influenced by their group’s 
visibility of business activity (p < .05) whereas the probability of such perceptions is 
reduced as the visibility of general business activity increases (p < .05).  These results 
lend support to the notion that economic enclaves among certain immigrant groups 
provide group members with an alternative to the dominant economic system (Butler 
and Herring 1991), which may discriminate on the basis of race or gender (McCall 2001) 
or language ability (Kossoudji 1988). 
Whites are significantly less likely to have positive financial outlooks as the 
visibility of white-owned businesses increases (p < .01).  Scholars who have shown that 
whites living in areas with large black populations tend to vote more segregationist have 
explained whites’ behavior by postulating that such behavior is the result of perceived 
greater threat of racial competition (Wright, Jr. 1976).   Yet, the findings here suggest 
whites even respond negatively to increases in their own group’s economic activity.  In 
addition, previous studies have shown that whites’ financial perceptions are influenced 
by such factors as unemployment.  The results here support these earlier studies.  
Whites’ perceptions of their financial prospects are significantly less likely to be positive 
as unemployment increases.  It is the only group for which unemployment has any 
effect. 
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  In sum, Hispanics and whites are significantly less likely to assess their financial 
prospects as more favorable as the visibility of local business activity increases. While 
Asians’ perceptions of their financial prospects are significantly and positively 
influenced by the visibility of Asian-owned business activity, blacks’ perceptions are 
largely shaped by whether one lives in an urban environment or not.  Blacks who live in 
urban areas are significantly less likely to have positive financial outlooks.  The very 
high levels of residential segregation and educational attainment, thus, appear to be the 
primary factors influencing blacks’ perceptions of their financial prospects. 
 Whites in Texas have different responses to local economic conditions than do 
whites in the national survey sample, and this fact should give pause to accepting the 
findings presented here without further investigation.  Whites in Texas are significantly 
less likely to have positive financial prospects as the visibility of business activity 
increases (p < .06).  Whites in the national sample, while the sign on the coefficient is in 
the same direction, were not significantly influenced by the visibility of business 
activity.  The financial perceptions of whites in both studies are not substantially shaped 
by workforce competition, although those in Texas were significantly and negatively 
affected by unemployment.  
 The one factor that consistently and significantly influences whites’ financial 
perceptions in both samples is educational attainment.  The only other group whose 
financial perceptions were strongly shaped by educational attainment is blacks.  Asians 
and Hispanics’ perceptions are consistently and negatively affected by homeownership, 
a finding that suggests these groups experience considerable pressure to maintain a 
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certain standard of living.  While group-specific models cannot be directly compared, 
the pattern suggests, for blacks and whites, a shared socialization process whereby 
education is perceived as the route to success.  Hispanics and Asians, however, appear to 
share a common integration process whereby homeownership is, perhaps, viewed as a 
positive step toward achieving the American Dream but, simultaneously, depressing 
these individuals’ perceptions of their financial prospects.  
 Do these perceptions stimulate political activity?  Are racial and ethnic minority 
individuals with positive financial outlooks more likely to engage in political activity or 
less likely?  The question of how the prospective financial outlooks of individuals within 
these racial and ethnic groups affect their political behavior is the subject of the analysis 
below. 
Racial and Ethnic Groups’ Political Participation 
I have argued that evaluating the extent to which a single context influences the political 
behavior of blacks, Asians, Latinos, and whites --while accounting for their 
socioeconomic status – takes an initial step toward gaining some insight into why 
socioeconomic status functions differently as a predictor of racial and ethnic groups’ 
political participation.   The local economic context and its influence on individuals’ 
financial perceptions allows for a comparison of these groups’ behavior within not only 
the same context but also as an environment that one simply cannot avoid. As discussed 
earlier, minority groups live in very different environments and their perceptions of their 
financial prospects are, to varying degrees, influenced by their respective neighborhoods.  
The issue now is whether these perceptions influence minority political behavior. 
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 Theories of racial and ethnic minority groups’ political behavior tend to 
emphasize ingroup characteristics or contexts. The church or religious affiliation, for 
example, has been shown be an important context, both as an organizational and 
psychological resource for political action among blacks (e.g., Calhoun-Brown 1996; 
Harris 1994; Mattis 2001; Reese and Brown 1995).  While some scholars have asserted 
otherwise (Verba et al. 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), religious affiliation 
has been positively related to political activity among Latinos (Jones-Correa and Leal 
2001).  Still, the role of religion in Asians’ political behavior appears to have never been 
considered.  Thus, scholars’ understanding of religion and religious affiliation is based 
solely upon blacks and Latinos. Nonetheless, the religious institutional context has been 
linked to increased political activity, at least among blacks and Latinos. 
The legal context has also been considered with respect to some groups’ political 
behavior. The citizenship hypothesis may be regarded under this rubric (Lien 1994; 
Pachon 1987; Pachon and Desipio 1992). Evidence of the effects of citizenship is 
conflicting.  Some have found little empirical support that citizenship is a significant 
predictor of political activity (Lien 1994).  Other scholars, however, have found 
noncitizens are no less active than citizens. Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet (1989) found that 
the longer a noncitizen has spent in the U.S., the more likely he or she is to work in a 
civic group, contact an official, or contact the news media.  These scholars also found 
“noncitizens who believe that they do have a problem related to their ethnicity are 
clearly more likely to report having worked in a community group to solve a problem” 
(1989, 213).  
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Within the political context, theories of elite mobilization efforts and group 
empowerment have received considerable attention (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Cassel 
2002; Gay 2001; Jackson, Gerber, and Cain 1994; Leigley 2001; Pachon and DeSipio 
1992; Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Shaw, de la Garza, and Lee 2000). Empirical 
evidence of this phenomenon, at least for blacks, is conflicting.  Bobo and Gilliam 
(1990) found that black empowerment increases blacks’ participation by influencing 
levels of trust and political efficacy. However, Gay (2001) shows that the election of 
blacks to Congress only rarely increases participation among blacks.  Leighley (2001) 
also finds that political empowerment has no effect upon Latino participation.    
Closely related to group empowerment is racial group identity or consciousness 
(Lien 1997, 2001; Reese and Brown 1995; Thornton and Mizuno 1999)21.  Among 
blacks, increased levels of group identity have been associated with church attendance, 
especially political churches (Calhoun-Brown 1996; Reese and Brown 1995).  Such 
increases have also been associated with greater levels of pro-coalitional or positive 
attitudes to other racial and ethnic groups (Jackson, Gerber, and Cain 1994). 
Support for the group identity hypothesis as a motivator for political participation 
is mixed. Leighley and Vedlitz (1999) find that group identity is not significantly related 
to political participation among Anglos, blacks, Asians, or Latinos in Texas. Tam (1995) 
found Asians of Chinese-background were less likely to vote for the Democratic 
candidate of Chinese-decent.  Others, however, have found group identity to be an 
                                                
21 Several terms that are conceptually indistinguishable from ‘group identity’ are used within the extant 
literature (Leighley and Vedlitz (1999) use ‘group closeness’; Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet (1989) refer to 
group consciousness). 
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important factor in racial and ethnic minorities’ political participation (Lien 1994).  
Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet (1989) found that group consciousness “derives its force 
from its positive effects for Latinos and foreign-born Asians [but it] generally has little 
effect for Asians in the U.S., whites, and blacks” (1989, 211).  Lien (1994) found that, 
for both Asian- and Mexican-Americans, group identification was a significant 
mobilizing factor in activities other than voting (1994, 253).  
Although empirical support for many of the predominant theories of racial and 
ethnic minority groups’ political behavior varies, each of these theories demonstrate the 
importance of evaluating the political behavior of individuals of a racial or ethnic 
minority background within certain contexts.22  Still, such theories are generally 
particularistic with respect to the contextual traits associated with racial and ethnic 
groups’ political behavior.  In other words, previous racial and ethnic theories of such 
groups’ political participation have tended to focus quite narrowly upon factors that are 
relevant to one or two groups but may lack relevance or comparability with other groups. 
Further, empirical evidence of such theories is generally weak.   
Financial Perceptions and Political Behavior and Attitudes 
Of the few studies on minorities’ economic perceptions, evidence of sociotropic 
considerations on voters’ electoral decisions appears to be consistent across various 
groups.  Welch and Foster (1992) found that blacks’ perceptions of their groups’ 
economic well–being, as well as that of the national economy, positively influenced 
                                                
22 In addition, the racial or ethnic environment (Leighley 2001, esp. ch. 7; McClain and Karnig 1990; 
Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001; Santiago and Wilder 1991) and the community organizational 
environment (Garcia and de la Garza 1985) have also been evaluated in the extant literature. 
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blacks’ likelihood to vote Republican.  Sigelman’s (1991) study on whether Jews were 
more likely than other groups to cast a pocketbook-oriented vote, found that such voting 
was no more prominent among Jews than among Catholics and Protestants.  Women, 
although less likely to cast pocketbook votes than men, were also found to be as likely or 
more as men to cast sociotropic economic votes (Welch and Hibbing 1992).  Still, 
whether racial and ethnic minority individuals’ financial perceptions influence their 
likelihood to be politically active is a question that has not been considered in the extant 
literature. 
Still, minority individuals may be more likely to participate as a result of an 
increased sense of having a vested interest in the community.  Alternatively, if members 
of a group feel their financial prospects are good they may be less likely to be politically 
active, particularly if such groups have typically not looked to government for assistance 
(the “withdrawal perspective; see Rosenstone 1982). Nonetheless, positive perceptions 
increase one’s likelihood of political participation while negative perceptions will 
decrease one’s likelihood of political participation (H1). 
Results and Analysis 
Socioeconomic status, in general, increases individuals’ likelihood of engaging in 
political activity, which is consistent with earlier research (Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; 
Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).  In general, educational 
attainment, family income, age, and partisan strength are associated with increased 
probabilities of political participation, although Asians remain significantly less likely to 
be politically active. [Results not shown.] 
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 Higher levels of educational attainment and family income positively and 
significantly increase the likelihood of individual and social political engagement.  
Strong partisanship also increases these probabilities.  However, age significantly 
decreases the likelihood of engaging in at least one individually based political activity 
(p < .05). Consistent with previous studies, Asians are significantly less likely than are 
whites (the omitted reference group) to be active in either individually or socially based 
political activities. Neither Hispanics nor blacks are significantly less likely than whites 
to either have voted in the 1992 presidential election, contributed money, or contacted an 
official.   
Perceptions of Financial Prospects and Political Participation 
As Table 4.4 shows, Hispanic and black citizens’ perceptions of their financial prospects 
significantly influence their likelihood to engage in at least one individually based 
political activity.  However, where blacks with favorable financial outlooks are more 
likely to participate in such activities (p < .01) Hispanics with positive financial outlooks 
are less likely to engage in an individually based activity (p < .01).  
 Blacks with favorable financial outlooks are roughly 5% more likely to be active 
in at least one individually based activity, all else being equal.  Hispanics with positive 
financial outlooks, however, are an astounding 9% less likely to engage in such 
activities.  Neither Asian nor white citizens’ financial perceptions significantly affect 
their odds of participating in individually based political activities. 
 Individually based political activity also appears motivated by educational 
attainment among Hispanics and whites while family income is significantly related to 
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an increased likelihood of such engagement for Hispanics and blacks.  Older Hispanics, 
blacks, and whites are all significantly more likely to have voted, contributed money, 
displayed their political sentiments, or some combination of the three. 
 
 
TABLE 4.4 Financial Perceptions and Individually Based Political Participation, 
  By Group 
Independent Variable Hispanics Blacks Asians Whites 
Perceptions of 
Financial Prospects 
-.69** 
(.29) 
.51** 
(.23) 
.18 
(.34) 
-.17 
(.31) 
Education  .76*** 
(.17) 
.27 
(.18) 
.01 
(.20) 
.76*** 
(.22) 
Family income  .23** 
(.10) 
.20* 
(.12) 
.10 
(.11) 
.03 
(.14) 
Age  .08* 
(.05) 
.12** 
(.05) 
.09 
(.10) 
.15* 
(.07) 
Homeowner -.09 
(.34) 
.86** 
(.35) 
.34 
(.43) 
1.37** 
(.54) 
Strong Partisans  .16 
(.33) 
.63* 
(.32) 
1.08* 
(.43) 
2.06*** 
(.57) 
Constant -2.38** -4.18*** -3.02* -4.72** 
Log Likelihood -127.52 -123.80 -81.02 -73.05 
LR χ2 62.30 45.38 27.55 54.23 
Prob > χ2 .0000 .0000 .0003 .0000 
Observations 262 265 152 243 
Notes: Logit estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance based on one-tailed p-values. *** 
p = .000 ** p < .01 * p < .05 
Source: 1992 Economic Census: Survey of Minority-Owned Business Enterprises; 1995 Texas Minority 
Survey. 
 
 
 
 Regardless of racial or ethnic group background, citizens’ perceptions of their 
financial prospects do not significantly influence their decisions to engage in socially 
based political activity [Table 4.5].  Rather, educational attainment increases the odds of 
such participation among Hispanics, blacks, and whites.  Family income is also 
positively and significantly related to an increased likelihood of social political 
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participation for Hispanics and blacks but not among Asians or whites.  These latter two 
groups’ socially based participation appears to be motivated most strongly by 
homeownership status and, for Asians, strong partisanship. 
 
 
TABLE 4.5 Financial Perceptions and Socially Based Political Participation, By 
  Group 
Independent Variable Hispanics Blacks Asians Whites 
Perceptions of 
Financial Prospects 
-.16 
.23 
.30 
(.21) 
.08 
(.34) 
.01 
(.20) 
Education .23* 
.14 
.35** 
(.15) 
.26 
(.20) 
.37** 
(.13) 
Family income .20** 
.09 
.20* 
(.09) 
.11 
(.12) 
.12 
(.09) 
Age -.02 
.05 
.01 
(.04) 
-.16* 
(.09) 
-.06 
(.05) 
Homeowner -.08 
.33 
.21 
(.30) 
1.11** 
(.48) 
.79* 
(.40) 
Strong Partisans .43 
.30 
.26 
(.29) 
.98** 
(.38) 
.32 
(.29) 
Constant -.92 -2.68** -.12 -.903 
Log Likelihood -146.53 -148.53 -85.40 -147.83 
LR χ2 17.81 25.62 21.66 25.68 
Prob > χ2 .0129 .0006 .0029 .0006 
Observations 234 234 144 232 
Notes: Logit estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance based on one-tailed p-values. 
*** p = .000 ** p < .01 * p < .05 
Source: 1992 Economic Census: Survey of Minority-Owned Business Enterprises; 1995 Texas Minority 
Survey. 
 
Discussion 
Previous research on racial and ethnic groups’ political participation has emphasized the 
importance of individuals’ socioeconomic status as a determinant of political 
participation (Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).  While educational attainment and family 
income, as well as other individual attributes, have been shown in this study to have 
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mixed effects on such groups’ likelihood of engaging in various political activities, the 
role of citizens’ perceptions of their financial prospects is also an important factor in 
individually based political participation. 
 In addition, studies of economic voting have only considered the effects of 
macro-level economic conditions on voters’ economic perceptions and decisions (e.g., 
Brooks and Brady 1999; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992).  Studies assessing the 
influence of local economic conditions have considered its effects only upon citizens’ 
opinion formation of economic policies (Weatherford 1983), but have failed to explicitly 
evaluate the psychological link between such conditions and behavior. 
 I have argued that the link between economic conditions and political behavior is 
the effect of such conditions upon citizens’ perceptions of their financial prospects.  
When racial and ethnic groups are considered at the local level, it appears that whites’ 
financial outlooks are sensitive to unemployment rates as well as the visibility of white-
owned business activity.  Further, Latinos’ perceptions are influenced by both the 
visibility of general business activity and the visibility of their group’s business activity.  
The financial perceptions of blacks and Asians, however, are neither influenced by the 
visibility of general business activity nor by their group’s business activity, although 
Asians are significantly more likely to have positive financial outlooks as the amount of 
businesses increases.  In short, the only group for whom local economic conditions (as 
conceptualized here) have absolutely no effect is blacks.  Among black citizens, 
educational attainment is consistently the strongest predictor of positive financial 
outlooks. 
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 Despite the effects of local economic conditions upon whites’ financial outlooks, 
such perceptions do not influence whether members of this racial group engage in 
individually or socially based political activity. Rather, educational attainment continues 
to most strongly predict whites’ political participation.  Among Asians, while their 
financial perceptions do not influence participation probabilities, homeownership does 
increase the probability of socially based political activity (although not individually 
based activity).  In addition, although the source of blacks’ prospective financial 
outlooks remains unclear, it is clear that such perceptions have a positive effect upon 
black individuals’ likelihood of engaging in individually based political activity. 
 The group for whom this study has revealed most is Latinos.  The observation 
that Hispanics are significantly less likely to have positive financial perceptions as a 
result of increases in both the general and group’s visibility of business activity raises at 
least two considerations.  First, as the group with the lowest levels of educational 
attainment, Latinos may not feel adequately qualified for many of the jobs in areas with 
greater visibility of general business activity.  Second, greater visibility of Hispanic-
owned businesses may reflect greater degrees of residential segregation among this sub-
population.  Further, Latinos’ lower levels of political participation may reflect a group 
conundrum.  Individually, Latinos with higher education levels are more likely to 
participate in both individually- and socially-based political activities.  But, as a group, 
Latinos are also more likely to live in urban areas, where business activity is more 
concentrated.  As a result, it seems plausible that the effects of the visibility of business 
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activity somewhat neutralizes the positive effects of educational attainment on the 
likelihood of political engagement. 
 While the results of this endeavor are far from conclusive, they provide some 
guidance for future studies assessing racial and ethnic political participation in the 
United States.  Moreover, findings emerging out of the present chapter’s analyses raise 
several questions about theories purporting to explain white, black, Asian, and Hispanic 
levels of political participation.  In addition to some conclusions that may be drawn from 
this study, a few of these questions and as well as selected suggestions for how future 
research might proceed with addressing them are the subject of Chapter V, the 
concluding chapter of this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Scholars of racial and ethnic minority group political participation have tended to focus 
on theories particular to certain groups.  While such studies have yielded a rich body of 
knowledge about specific racial and ethnic groups’ political behavior, they have 
neglected to consider these groups’ behavior within a theoretical framework that 
includes all individuals, regardless of their racial or ethnic group background.  I have 
attempted to address these issues within the extant literatures through assessing the 
effects of citizens’ financial perceptions on their political participation. 
 In particular, I have postulated that individuals’ political behavior is not only a 
product of their socioeconomic status, but also of their perceptions of their financial 
prospects.  In addition, such perceptions are shaped, at least in part, by the local 
economic conditions in which the individual lives.  This theory is based on the 
observation that, within studies of mass, racial, and ethnic political participation, the role 
of financial perceptions has largely been ignored.  Yet, economic voting studies have 
extensively shown that such perceptions influence voters’ political attitudes and choices, 
but not political participation.  Moreover, social context studies have repeatedly shown 
that the local social environment influences individual’s political behavior.  Nonetheless, 
these studies have neglected to consider minorities’ political responses to the social 
environment and, further, have failed to examine the local economic context as a source 
of influence upon such behavior. 
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 Based upon these gaps within the extant literatures, three questions were 
assessed: the extent to which the local economic context influences individuals’ 
prospective financial outlooks; whether Asian, black, Latino, and white citizens’ 
perceptions are influenced more or less by their respective group’s economic conditions 
as opposed to the general economic environment; and how such perceptions affect 
individuals’ likelihood of engaging in political activity.  Empirical evaluations of these 
questions have produced, at best, mixed results. 
Summary of Findings 
Among a national sample of whites, neither the visibility of business activity nor 
workforce competition significantly affects individuals’ perceptions of their financial 
prospects.  Rather, whites with higher levels of educational attainment are more likely to 
have such perceptions while family income and age decrease this probability. Further, 
positive perceptions of one’s financial prospects do not significantly increase the 
likelihood of engaging in individually based political activities.  Even more surprising, 
whites with positive financial outlooks are about 5% less likely to engage in socially 
based political activities. 
 When the four racial and ethnic groups are considered, results show that Latino 
and white citizens are significantly less likely to have positive financial assessments as 
the visibility of local business activity increases while Asians’ perceptions are more 
likely to be favorable as the amount of business activity increases (as opposed to the 
visibility of activity).  Moreover, none of the groups is influenced by workforce 
competition.  Rather, for blacks and whites, educational attainment is the key indicator 
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of better financial outlooks.  Among Asians and Latinos, however, homeownership is the 
primary deterrent to positive financial evaluations.  Finally, living in an urban area is 
only significantly related to less positive perceptions among black citizens. 
 Thus, possible answers to the question of the extent to which local economic 
conditions influence individuals’ prospective financial outlooks of different racial and 
ethnic groups, beyond those which may be inferred by the empirical results, must take 
into account which group is being considered as well as the measure of the economic 
context being employed.  For instance, whites’ financial perceptions are clearly 
influenced more by unemployment levels than by economic opportunities or workforce 
competition but living in an urban area, for blacks, is a prominent factor in these 
individuals’ financial assessments. 
 Perhaps of greater interest in the pursuit of identifying a common context that 
acts as an influence on racial and ethnic group members’ financial outlooks is that of the 
group-specific economic context.  Although the nature of the influence varies, group-
specific economic conditions influence individuals’ financial perceptions more 
consistently across groups, suggesting that there is something about individuals’ 
responses to their particular group’s economic conditions that warrant further 
examination. 
 When group-specific economic conditions are evaluated along with the general 
economic context, Latinos’ financial outlooks continue to be negatively influenced by 
their group’s visibility of business activity while Asian and white citizens’ financial 
perceptions are now significantly influenced by their respective group’s economic 
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condition.  But, for Asians, the effect is positive while, for whites, it is negative.  Thus, 
although group-specific economic conditions influence three of the four groups’ 
perceptions, they do so in different ways. 
 Responses to the third question addressing the issue of whether positive financial 
outlooks increase the likelihood of political participation must be tendered cautiously.  
While the financial perceptions of Latinos significantly decrease the likelihood of 
engaging in individually based political acts, such perceptions increase this likelihood 
among blacks. Further such perceptions do not appear to influence Asians or whites’ 
political behavior. 
Implications 
Results of previous economic voting studies show macroeconomic indicators such as 
unemployment rates affect voters’ political attitudes and vote choices. The theoretical 
underpinnings of such studies, that white voters punish incumbents for downturns in the 
economy, however, are only partially substantiated.  While whites are less likely to have 
positive perceptions of their financial prospects as unemployment rates increase, such 
perceptions among citizens do not directly influence the likelihood of engaging in 
individually based political activities.  Moreover, unemployment does not significantly 
affect the financial perceptions of any of the other racial and ethnic groups considered 
here.  Rather, homeownership (for Asians and Latinos) and educational attainment (for 
blacks and whites) explain the financial perceptions of members of these groups more 
consistently than traditional economic context measures. 
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 In addition, research on the effects of the social context on citizens’ political 
behavior and attitudes have consistently shown the social environment exerts a strong 
influence on such behavior.  Still, these studies have not explicitly accounted for the 
psychological link between the individual and the social context being evaluated.  The 
present analysis has attempted to address this shortcoming through explicitly accounting 
for the psychological response, those of financial perceptions, and the local economic 
context.  The results are less than compelling: Asians and, in particular, whites (the 
group almost exclusively studied in contextual studies) do not appear to be any more or 
less likely participate as a result of their financial perceptions.  However, Latinos are 
significantly less likely, while blacks are more likely, to engage in individually based 
political activity as a result of their financial perceptions.  Whether these findings offer 
significant insight into these groups’ levels of political participation remains a subject 
for future research. 
 The results of this dissertation also encourage scholars within the field of 
economic voting to further explore, first, what accounts for the financial perceptions of 
racial and ethnic minority groups and, second, whether voters’ financial outlooks differ 
from non-voters.  In addition, such research may also consider more explicitly the 
differences between national and local economic factors as sources of influence on 
voters’ (or citizens, more generally) political attitudes and choices. 
 Likewise, social context studies, which have overwhelmingly relied upon 
aggregated measures of individual attributes as indicators of the social environment, 
would be enriched through more theoretically and empirically explicit connections 
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between the individual’s behavior and the environment by which such behavior is 
believed to be influenced.  Particularly in light of the findings here that show individuals 
of different racial or ethnic backgrounds are sensitive to their group’s economic 
contexts, research evaluating the effects of the social context on these individuals’ 
political behavior could be enriched through further investigation.  Indeed, the finding 
that three of the four groups are significantly influenced by group-specific contexts 
suggests these groups have more in common than previous minority studies have 
indicated. 
Future Research and Conclusion 
Despite the mixed results of this study, this dissertation has revealed that racial and 
ethnic groups share common motivations behind their political behavior.  For instance, 
political participation among Latinos and whites in Texas (the two dominant groups both 
politically and socially) with higher levels of educational attainment are more likely to 
participate.  Yet, Latinos’ positive financial perceptions decrease their likelihood of 
political activity while such perceptions do not significantly influence whites’ political 
behavior.  Moreover, the sources of those perceptions for these two groups are very 
different: educational attainment for whites, visibility of business activity for Latinos.  
The observation that the financial perceptions of any of the groups do not influence the 
likelihood of engaging in socially based political activities, while not initially 
hypothesized, raises questions worth pursuing.  For example, if whites’ political activity 
is motivated by such concerns as group threat, why are not whites more likely to 
participate as a result of less positive financial outlooks? 
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 And therein lies the rub:  while individuals within the four racial and ethnic 
groups considered in the present analysis are neither motivated by the same economic 
factors nor do their financial perceptions consistently influence their political behavior, 
this, in-and-of-itself, indicates a commonality among individuals across groups.  In other 
words, while the nature of the relationship was unanticipated, the fact that the 
prospective financial outlooks of individuals within any of the groups do not influence 
their likelihood of political participation is an observation shared by each group’s 
citizens. 
 The implications of this finding for a country such as the United States, a nation 
that regards itself as a nation of opportunity and individual liberty to pursue the 
American Dream, regardless or race, creed, religion, or sex, are extensive.  If economic 
opportunity does not increase one’s propensity to engage in the political system, is 
political activity merely an exercise in non-substantive self-gratification?  If individuals 
are neither more nor less likely to participate based on their financial outlooks, what 
other common psychological factors might account for their political behavior? Is the 
likelihood of political activity largely dependent on the mobilization efforts of political 
elites?  These are just a sampling of the questions future studies of race and ethnic group 
political behavior may pursue. 
 The implications of the analysis presented here extend beyond the borders of the 
United States.  As mentioned in Chapter I, economic, social, and political isolation 
among racial and ethnic groups has the very real potential to lead to social and political 
upheaval, as the 2005 riots in France illustrate.  This potential has not been lost on 
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scholars of ethnic conflict.  Gurr and Moore (1997), for instance, found that 
ethnopolitical rebellion is significantly related to group grievances and that such 
grievances stem from a host of factors, including economic discrimination.  At the same 
time, studies on regime stability have shown that “[per capita] income has a large and 
statistically significant coup-inhibiting effect” (Londregan and Poole 1990, 165).  
 Together, studies of ethnic conflict and political stability suggest, first, a need to 
further explore the influence of local economic conditions and opportunities on ethnic 
groups’ political behavior within a comparative framework.  For instance, if per capita 
income (pci) decreases a government’s tendency to be overthrown through extralegal 
means, might ethnic groups be more likely to engage in conventional (as opposed to 
unconventional or illegal) forms of political activity as their group pci increases?  What 
behavioral differences might scholars expect not only between racial and ethnic groups 
but also between third world and developing countries, which are overwhelmingly the 
focus of research, and long-established democracies? 
 Future research that builds upon this dissertation, then, takes two paths.  The first 
involves further consideration of why citizens’ perceptions of their financial prospects 
do not more consistently affect Asian, black, Latino, and white Americans’ political 
behavior.  As part of this consideration, one cannot rule out the possibility that the 
measures employed to test individuals’ perceptions and the local economic context may 
be insufficient and, as such, require further development. 
 The second path is not entirely divergent from the first.  Given the abundance of 
comparative studies on ethnic conflict but the dearth of research on racial and ethnic 
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groups’ participation, fertile ground for research lies in the field of evaluating the 
political behavior of racial and ethnic groups prior to points of conflict.  By building 
upon the theoretical framework of psychological responses to local economic 
opportunities, notwithstanding the empirical challenges of such an endeavor, some 
insight might be gained on such questions as why various groups form coalitions and 
others do not or, alternatively, what the influences are of differential distribution policies 
among racial and ethnic groups on these groups’ political behavior. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
TABLE 3.1-A  Individual Attributes and Political Participation 
Socioeconomic 
Status and 
Attributes Vote Talk Display Attend Work Money Volunteer Community 
Education .52*** 
(.06) 
.13*** 
(.04) 
.15** 
(.05) 
.24*** 
(.06) 
.24** 
(.10) 
.32*** 
(.05) 
.28*** 
(.04) 
.30*** 
(.04) 
Family Income  .08*** 
(.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
.01 
(.02) 
.03 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.03) 
.06*** 
(.02) 
.02** 
(.01) 
.04** 
(.01) 
Class (3 pt) .13** 
(.12) 
.08 
(.09) 
-.05 
(.14) 
.16 
(.16) 
.51* 
(.25) 
.32** 
(.14) 
.00 
(.09) 
-.09 
(.11) 
Age .03*** 
(.00) 
-.01*** 
(.00) 
-.01* 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
.02** 
(.01) 
.00 
(.00) 
.02*** 
(.00) 
Male -.15 
(.13) 
.32** 
(.10) 
.03 
(.16) 
.16 
(.18) 
-.16 
(.28) 
.41** 
(.16) 
-.05 
(.11) 
-.16 
(.12) 
Strong Partisans .43*** 
(.09) 
.36*** 
(.07) 
.22* 
(.10) 
.28** 
(.11) 
.07 
(.17) 
.17 
(.10) 
-.06 
(.07) 
-.16* 
(.08) 
         
Constant -
2.77*** 
(.29) 
-.79*** 
(.22) 
-2.38*** 
(.34) 
-
4.11*** 
(.34) 
-
5.03*** 
(.66) 
-
5.32*** 
(.42) 
-1.87*** 
(.24) 
-3.29*** 
(.29) 
Log Likelihood -709.90 -
1066.63 
-589.41 -451.50 -226.10 -550.47 -1027.79 -823.99 
LR χ2 313.97 95.44 23.02 49.85 23.06 150.35 102.18 106.76 
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 1645 1645 1646 1645 1646 1640 1637 1642 
Notes: Logit estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance based on one-tailed p-values. 
*** p = .000 ** p < .01 * p < .05 
Source: 1992 Economic Census; 1992 NES. 
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TABLE 3.2-A  Financial Perceptions and Political Participation 
Socioeconomic 
Status and 
Attributes Vote Talk Display Attend Work Money Volunt Comm 
Perceptions of 
Financial 
Prospects 
.17 
(.10) 
.00 
(.09) 
-.03 
(.13) 
-.17 
(.15) 
-.27 
(.24) 
-.04 
(.13) 
-.12 
(.09) 
-.17* 
(.11) 
Education .51*** (.06) 
.12*** 
(.04) 
.14** 
(.06) 
.23*** 
(.06) 
.21* 
(.10) 
.31*** 
(.05) 
.27*** 
(.04) 
.30*** 
(.04) 
Family Income  .08*** (.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
.01 
(.02) 
.03 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.03) 
.06** 
(.02) 
.02* 
(.01) 
.04** 
(.01) 
Class (3 pt) .14 (.12) 
.09 
(.09) 
-.02 
(.12) 
.19 
(.16) 
.53* 
(.25) 
.34* 
(.14) 
.01 
(.09) 
-.08 
(.11) 
Age .03*** (.00) 
-.01*** 
(.00) 
-.01* 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
.02* 
(.01) 
.00 
(.00) 
.02*** 
(.00) 
Male - .16 (.14) 
.32** 
(.11) 
.06 
(.16) 
.23 
(.19) 
-.10 
(.29) 
.47** 
(.16) 
-.02 
(.11) 
-.13 
(.13) 
Strong 
Partisans 
.43*** 
(.09) 
.35*** 
(.07) 
.20* 
(.10) 
.25* 
(.12) 
.08 
(.18) 
.10 
(.10) 
-.06 
(.07) 
-.13* 
(.08) 
         
Constant -3.05*** -0.80** -2.33*** -3.80*** -4.58*** -5.26*** -1.68*** -3.04*** 
Log Likelihood -692.93 -1042.55 -571.40 -432.38 -218.51 -537.45 -999.77 -797.57 
LR χ2 306.29 86.90 20.11 47.06 21.84 145.41 97.16 105.52 
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0053 0.0000 0.0027 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 1602 1603 1603 1602 1603 1597 1594 1599 
Notes: Logit estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance based on one-tailed p-values. 
*** p = .000 ** p < .01 * p < .05 
Source: 1992 Economic Census; 1992 NES. 
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TABLE 3.3-A Financial Perceptions and Individuals’ Likelihood of Political  
  Participation 
Perceptions 
of Financial 
Prospects 
Pr 
(Vote) 
Pr 
(Talk) 
Pr 
(Display) 
Pr 
(Attend) 
Pr 
(Work) 
Pr 
(Money) 
Pr 
(Volunt) 
Pr 
(Comm) 
Worse 0.81 0.41 0.12 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.40 0.24 
Same 0.83 0.41 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.37 0.21 
Better 0.86 0.41 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.34 0.19 
Mean 0.78 
(0.18) 
0.41 
(0.11) 
0.12 
(0.04) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
0.32 
(0.02) 
0.13 
(0.11) 
0.37 
(0.12) 
0.22 
(0.11) 
Observatio
ns 1776 1776 1776 1776 1776 1776 1776 1776 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 3.4-A Financial Perceptions and Individuals’ Probability of Engaging In 
  One or More Individually and Socially Based Political Activities 
Perceptions of Financial Prospects 
Pr(At least one Individually 
Based Activity) 
Pr(At least one Socially 
Based Activity) 
Worse 0.84 0.50 
Same 0.85 0.46 
Better 0.86 0.43 
Mean 0.79 
(0.17) 
0.45 
(0.14) 
Observations 1776 1776 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 3.5-A The Economic Context and Political Participation (Whites only) 
Independent 
Variable Vote Talk Display Attend Work Money Volunt Comm 
Visibility of 
Business Activity 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00* 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
Workforce 
Competition 
-.08** 
(.03) 
.03 
(.03) 
-.05 
(.04) 
-.02 
(.05) 
.14* 
(.07) 
-.01 
(.00) 
-.03 
(.03) 
-.05 
(.03) 
Education .51*** (.06) 
.12*** 
(.04) 
.15** 
(.05) 
.25*** 
(.06) 
.24** 
(.10) 
.31*** 
(.05) 
.29*** 
(.04) 
.31*** 
(.04) 
Family Income .07*** (.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
.01 
(.02) 
.03 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.03) 
.06*** 
(.02) 
.03** 
(.01) 
.04*** 
(.01) 
Class (3 pt) .12 (.12) 
.06 
(.09) 
-.06 
(.14) 
.19 
(.16) 
.52* 
(.25) 
.31** 
(.14) 
.03 
(.09) 
-.07 
(.11) 
Age .03*** (.00) 
-.01*** 
(.00) 
-.01* 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
.02** 
(.01) 
.00 
(.00) 
.02*** 
(.00) 
Male -.15 (.14) 
.32** 
(.10) 
.03 
(.16) 
.16 
(.18) 
-.15 
(.29) 
.43** 
(.16) 
-.06 
(.11) 
-.17 
(.11) 
Strong Partisans .44*** (.09) 
.36*** 
(.07) 
.23** 
(.10) 
.28** 
(.11) 
.08 
(.17) 
.11 
(.10) 
-.06 
(.07) 
-.16* 
(.08) 
Business Activity -.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00* 
(.00) 
County size -.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00* 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
Urban .21 
(.16) 
.11 
(.13) 
.12 
(.20) 
-.18 
(.23) 
.49 
(.40) 
.13 
(.22) 
-.22* 
(.13) 
-.09 
(.16) 
Population, 18-64 .00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00** 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
Constant -
2.05*** 
-
1.22*** 
-2.96*** -3.76*** -6.50*** -5.33*** -1.47*** -2.71*** 
Log Likelihood -704.97 -
1064.32 
-587.24 -449.11 -219.87 -544.78 -1021.83 -818.87 
LR χ2 323.84 100.06 27.36 54.63 35.52 161.73 114.10 117.00 
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0069 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 1645 1645 1646 1645 1646 1640 1637 1642 
Notes: Logit estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance based on one-tailed p-values. 
*** p = .000 ** p < .01 * p < .05 
Source: 1992 Economic Census; 1992 NES. 
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TABLE 3.6-A Visibility of Business Activity and Individuals’ Likelihood of Political  
  Participation 
 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Visibility of 
Business 
Activity 
Pr 
(Vote) 
Pr 
(Talk) 
Pr 
(Display) 
Pr 
(Attend) 
Pr 
(Work) 
Pr 
(Money) 
Pr 
(Volunt) 
Pr 
(Comm) 
Mean 0.78 (0.19) 
0.41 
(0.12) 
0.12 
(0.04) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.13 
(0.12) 
0.37 
(0.13) 
0.22 
(0.12) 
1-unit 
increase  0.85 0.43 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.12 0.38 0.22 
∆  0.07 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 
N 1827 1827 1827 1827 1827 1827 1827 1827 
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Table 3.7-A The Economic Context, Perceptions of Financial Prospects and the 
  Likelihood of  Political Participation  (Whites only) 
Independent 
Variables Vote Talk Display Attend Work Money Volunt Comm 
Financial 
Prospects 
.17 
(.11) 
.00 
(.09) 
-.03 
(.13) 
-.17 
(.16) 
-.34 
(.25) 
-.05 
(.13) 
-.12 
(.09) 
-.18* 
(.11) 
Visibility of 
Business 
Activity 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00* 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
Workforce 
Competition  
-.08** 
(.03) 
.04 
(.03) 
-.05 
(.04) 
-.02 
(.05) 
.13* 
(.07) 
-.01 
(.04) 
-.02 
(.03) 
-.04 
(.03) 
Education .51*** 
(.06) 
.12** 
(.04) 
.14** 
(.06) 
.25*** 
(.06) 
.21* 
(.10) 
.30*** 
(.06) 
.28*** 
(.04) 
.31*** 
(.04) 
Family Income .07*** 
(.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
.01 
(.02) 
.03 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.03) 
.06** 
(.02) 
.02** 
(.01) 
.04** 
(.01) 
Class (3 pt) .13** 
(.12) 
.07 
(.09) 
-.03 
(.14) 
.21 
(.16) 
.52* 
(.25) 
.32** 
(.14) 
.04 
(.10) 
-.06 
(.11) 
Age .03*** 
(.00) 
-.01*** 
(.00) 
-.01* 
(.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
.02** 
(.01) 
.00 
(.00) 
.02*** 
(.00) 
Male -.15 
(.14) 
.33** 
(.11) 
.06 
(.16) 
.23 
(.19) 
-.07 
(.29) 
.49** 
(.16) 
-.03 
(.11) 
-.14 
(.13) 
Strong 
Partisans 
.43*** 
(.09) 
.35*** 
(.07) 
.21* 
(.10) 
.25* 
(.12) 
.09 
(.18) 
.09 
(.10) 
-.06 
(.07) 
-.14 
(.13) 
Business 
Activity 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00** 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
County size -.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00* 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
Urban .22 
(.16) 
.12 
(.13) 
.15 
(.20) 
-.10 
(.24) 
.64 
(.41) 
.18 
(.22) 
-.21 
(.13) 
-.11 
(.16) 
Population, 
18-64 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
-.00** 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
Constant -2.33*** -1.29** -2.92*** -3.54*** -5.98*** -5.30*** -1.38*** -2.52*** 
Log 
Likelihood -688.16 -1039.67 -569.06 -430.03 -211.47 531.43 -994.22 -792.73 
LR χ2 315.83 92.66 24.80 51.75 25.90 157.47 108.24 115.20 
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0246 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Observations 1602 1603 1603 1602 1603 1597 1594 1599 
Notes: Logit estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance based on one-tailed p-values. 
*** p = .000 ** p < .01 * p < .05 
Source: 1992 Economic Census; 1992 NES. 
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TABLE 3.8-A Visibility of Business Activity, Perceptions, and Individuals’ 
  Likelihood of Political Participation 
VBA and 
Financial 
Perceptions 
Pr 
(Vote) 
Pr 
(Talk) 
Pr 
(Display) 
Pr 
(Attend) 
Pr 
(Work) 
Pr 
(Money) 
Pr 
(Volunt) 
Pr 
(Comm) 
Mean 0.78 (0.19) 
0.41 
(0.12) 
0.12 
(0.04) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.13 
(0.12) 
0.37 
(0.13) 
0.22 
(0.12) 
1-unit 
increase  0.84 0.43 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.12 0.38 0.22 
∆  0.06 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.00 
Observations 1776 1776 1776 1776 1776 1776 1776 1776 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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